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INTRODUCTION
The last half-century has witnessed a dramatic rise in both health care
spending and associated efforts to rein in costs.I As these factors and others
coalesced, the "managed care revolution" was born.2 In the last several decades,
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) - along with other managed care
organizations (MCOs), such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs), point of
service (POS) plans, and managed indemnity plans - have attempted to balance
patients' quality of care against steadily rising health care costs.3 Although
insurers greatly have improved access to care, they have faced sharp criticism
from health care providers. Physicians and pharmacists, in particular, have
accused insurers of using their unbridled market power to threaten providers'
decision-making autonomy, endanger their livelihoods, and reduce the quality of
4patient care. As a result, a growing number of providers have begun to search
for ways to bolster their bargaining power in order to negotiate more
advantageous terms with MCOs.s
As one solution for equalizing bargaining power, health care providers have
proposed the relaxation of antitrust restrictions, thereby allowing these providers
to join together with their competitors and collectively bargain with MCOs.
Despite considerable support among the medical community for this approach,
current antitrust and labor laws prevent providers from engaging in these
activities. As a general matter, "[o]rganizations of independent [medical
providers] who collectively mandate health-care prices fall directly within the
scope of illegal price fixing. Likewise, a collective refusal by such groups to
comply with the terms of managed care plans or a collective boycotting of
managed care plans may constitute illegal trade restraints." 6 Although the labor
exemptions under the antitrust laws and the National Labor Relations Act
I See generally Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care
Revolution, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2002) (discussing the factors that converged to produce
the "managed care revolution").
2 See id. at 34 ("Health care costs continued to escalate. During the decades that followed the
passage of the [Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)] Act, increasing numbers of employees
had the opportunity to enroll in HMOs. The managed care revolution was underway.").
3 Robert P. Navarro & Judith A. Cahill, The U.S. Health Care System and the Development of
Managed Care, in MANAGED CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE 3, 5 (Robert P. Navarro ed., 1999).
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Devine, Physician Unionization: A Prescription for Modern
Managed Care, 4 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 39, 40 (2000) (discussing physician frustrations with
managed care organizations (MCOs)); Dionne Koller Fine, Exploitation of the Elite: A Case for
Physician Unionization, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 207, 211-14 (2001) (arguing for physician
unionization); Navarro & Cahill, supra note 3, at 4, 24 (discussing pharmacists' frustration with
MCOs); Kevin J. Smith, Power and Control of Managing Medicine: Recent Developments, 33
UWLA L. REV. 191, 195-99 (2001) (discussing physician unionization).
5 John G. Deis, Comment, The Unionization of Independent Contracting Physicians: A
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(NLRA) allow "employees" engaged in collective-bargaining activities to escape
antitrust scrutiny,7 many health care providers are not likely to fall within this
-8
exemption.
As a result, these providers have turned to Congress to obtain their own
antitrust exemption. Most recently, in May of 2011, New York Representative
Anthony Weiner introduced the Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011. If
passed, this Act would grant independent pharmacies negotiating with a health
plan over the provision of health care items or services the same preferable
treatment as is afforded to employees engaged in collective bargaining with their
employer under the NLRA. 9 Weiner's bill followed on the heels of a similar
proposal, introduced only one month earlier, to exempt, under certain conditions,
all health care professionals engaged in contract negotiations with insurers from
antitrust restrictions. 0
While numerous scholars have written about physicians' efforts to obtain an
exemption to federal antitrust laws,'' the academic community has paid little
attention to the unique circumstances of pharmacists. Pharmacists and physicians
cannot be treated in the same fashion, as the two groups have distinct practices,
insurance arran ements, and concerns. Independent pharmacists
("independents"), in particular, have fought hard for an antitrust exemption.
7 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (giving private-sector
employees the "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection").
8 For a discussion of why this is the case, see infra Subsection II.A.2.
9 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1839, 112th Cong. (2011).
10 Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2011, H.R. 1409, 112th Cong. (2011).
11 See, e.g., Carl F. Ameringer, Federal Antitrust Policy and Physician Discontent: Defining
Moments in the Struggle for Congressional Relief, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 543 (2002);
Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: An
Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2003); Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician
Collective Bargaining: State Legislation and the State Action Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1731
(2005); Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 189 (2007); Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act's Unintended Bias
Against Lilliputians: Small Players' Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2001); Richard M. Scheffler, Physician Collective Bargaining: A Turning
Point in U.S. Medicine, 24 J. HEALTH PoL. PoL'Y & L. 1071 (1999); John A. Powers, Note, The
Stifling of Competition by the Antitrust Laws: The Irony of the Health Care Industry, 15 J.L. &
HEALTH 223 (2000-2001).
12 The definition of an "independent" pharmacist has differed somewhat depending on who
has defined the term, when, and in what context. Essentially an independent is a pharmacy with a
low market share and/or single (or small number) of store locations. See, e.g., Preserving Our
Hometown Independent Pharmacies Act of 2011, H.R. 1946, 112th Cong. § 2(i)(3)-(4) (2011)
(defining the term "independent pharmacy" to "mean[] a pharmacy that has a market share of-(A)
less than 10 percent in any PDP region [as defined in section 1680D- Il(a)(2) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. § 1395w-Il l(a)(2))]; and (B) less than 1 percent in the United States"); KAITLiN
BOYLE, FRED ULLRICH & KEITH MULLER, RUPRI CTR. FOR RURAL HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS,
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They argue that their weak bargaining power in relation to that of insurers has
prevented them from effectively competing in the marketplace against chain and
mail-order pharmacies to the detriment of their patients. In support of their
position, independents have asserted that they are essentially powerless to oppose
MCOs. Specifically, independents claim that MCOs have interfered with the
patient-provider relationship, established draconian restrictions on
pharmaceutical delivery, and reduced independents' reimbursements to
unsustainable levels.13
This Note argues that the proposed antitrust exemption for independent
pharmacies cannot be justified under the economic principles underlying antitrust
law, on which independents have based their arguments. This Note begins by
providing a novel analysis of the struggle of independent and community
pharmacists in their efforts to obtain an antitrust exemption separate from that of
physicians and other health care providers, including pharmacists working at
supermarkets and chain pharmacies. In order to illustrate why independents feel
such an exemption is needed, Part I lays out the landscape of the pharmaceutical
supply chain. Next, Part II describes the current antitrust and labor laws to
explain why independents currently are prohibited from collectively bargaining
with MCOs. It then proceeds to outline the recent legislative initiatives to allow
independents to bargain collectively with insurers.
Finally, Part III provides an analysis of the economic rationales put forth to
justify the exemption initiatives identified in Part II. It explains - and ultimately
rejects-independents' arguments that an antitrust exemption would improve
patients' quality of care, while stabilizing or lowering health care costs.
Specifically, it challenges independents' claim that there is sufficient evidence
that MCOs reduce consumer welfare and undermine the efficiency of the health
care market. This Note further argues that the proposed exemption would not be
the appropriate method for remedying such a market failure, even if it could be
said definitively to exist. In doing so, this Part concludes that in their quest for an
antitrust exemption, independents have not compellingly demonstrated that an
exception would achieve any societal goal that would trump the efficiencies
created by free-market competition.
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN
To evaluate the proposed antitrust exemption, one must begin with an
CLOSURES IN RURAL AMERICA, 2003-2010, at 4 n.l (2011) (noting that the National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs defines "an independent pharmacy as one to three pharmacies under
common ownership"); What Happened to the Independent Pharmacy Antitrust Exemption Bill?, 6
H. D. SMITH PHARMACY FORUM 2 (2011) (noting that the Community Pharmacy Fairness Practice
Act of 2007 was amended to "narrow the bill's definition of independent pharmacy to those [that]
have less than 10 percent of the market share of a Medicare Part D prescription drug region").
13 Navarro & Cahill, supra note 3, at 24.
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understanding of independents' current position within the pharmaceutical
industry. Numerous parties, intertwined through complex and often
inconspicuous financial relationships, form the pharmaceutical supply chain.14 it
is within this complicated framework that independents - located at the bottom
of the pharmaceutical supply chain - claim that they are being squeezed in their
negotiations with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).
The chain begins with the pharmaceutical manufacturers, who sell
pharmaceuticals in bulk to wholesalers. These wholesalers, in turn, sell
manufacturers' drugs to pharmacies and hospitals, which finally distribute them
to patients.15 When a consumer fills a prescription at a pharmacy, the pharmacy
either accepts a cash payment directly from the patient or, alternatively, seeks
reimbursement from the patient's MCO or employer. Rather than directly
reimbursing pharmacists who serve insurers' customers, the vast majority of
insurers have outsourced the administration of their prescription drug programs
to PBMs, who typically are either stand-alone entities or subsidiaries of the
MCOs.16 As PBMs "specialize[] in managing drug benefits," the advent of
PBMs has allowed insurers to manage drug costs more effectively.17 Acting as a
middleman, the PBM reimburses the pharmacy for its expenditure and service,
while simultaneously charging the patient's MCO more for the expense.
One of the ways that the PBM earns profits is by maximizing the "spread":
the difference between the price that the PBM charges an MCO for a given drug
and that which it reimburses the pharmacy.19 Thus, a PBM optimizes profits by
seeking to charge an MCO the highest amount possible for a drug, while
reimbursing a pharmacy as little as possible. 20 PBMs' primary mechanism for
14 For an excellent, detailed discussion of the pharmaceutical supply and the role of pharmacy
benefit managers in the delivery of pharmaceuticals, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, PHARMACY BENEFIT
MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES (2005).
15 HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY, LLC, FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING THE U.S.
COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN, OREGON WORKERS' COMPENSATION DiviSION 1
(2006), available at http://www.cbs.state.or.us/wcd/rdrs/mqi/follow pill.pdf.
16 J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119,
126-27 (D. Mass. 2005); Robert P. Navarro, Pharmacy Benefit Management Principles and
Practices, in MANAGED CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 29, 33-32 and accompanying
text.
17 PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, MANAGED CARE: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 90 (3d ed. 2009).
By contracting on behalf of multiple MCOs, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) have more
bargaining power than an individual MCO or sponsor would have on its own. See HOWARD BRODY,
HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 63 (2007). This
may be the case both with respect not only to negotiations with pharmacies, but also (and perhaps
most importantly) with respect to negotiations with manufacturers. See infra notes 27-3 1.
18 MARIE A. CHISHOLM-BURNS ET AL., PHARMACY MANAGEMENT, LEADERSHIP, MARKETING,
AND FINANCE 181 (2001).
19 Id.
20 PBMs compensate pharmacists for their services through a formula based on the drug's
average wholesale price (also known as the "AWP") minus a percentage plus a dispensing fee. J.E.
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gaining bargaining leverage vis-dt-vis the pharmacists with whom they contract is
to create "pharmacy networks."21 These consist of the retail pharmacies from
which a given MCO's customer can fill a prescription.22 A pharmacy can only
join a network if it agrees to a low, yet guaranteed, reimbursement formula.23
A given pharmacy will want to join as many networks as economically
feasible in order to gain access to the PBMs' client bases as well as to ensure
stable and reliable sources of income.24 It can be devastating for a pharmacy to
be excluded from a network because MCOs either force their patients to only
purchase their drugs from network pharmacies or entice them to do so by
offering significant financial incentives.25 Constraining their customers in this
way allows MCOs to gain the bargaining leverage necessary to negotiate the low
rates at which they reimburse pharmacies for supplying drugs and services to
MCOs' customers. At least according to independents, because the independent
needs the PBM more than the PBM needs the independent, PBMs are able to
force "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts-termed contracts of adhesion-on the
independents with whom they contract.
A PBM is able to leverage bargaining power not only by controlling which
pharmacies the MCO's plan subscribers can frequent, but also by determining the
pharmaceuticals that subscribers' plans will cover.26 By engaging in these
strategic negotiations, a PBM receives payments from manufacturers called
"rebates," which the PBM then passes on to the MCOs through below-market
prices.27 While the PBM passes aportion of this rebate on to the MCO, it retains
a fraction of the rebate for itself. It is through these additional transactions that
independents, as discussed later, allege, in part, that the PBM is able to inflate its
profits, reimbursing pharmacists at rates that do not reveal these additional
21 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 14, at 4-5.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Robert P. Navarro, Prescription Drug Benefits in Managed Care, in ESSENTIALS OF
MANAGED CARE 293, 311 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2003).
24 HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY, LLC, supra note 15, at 1-2.
25 FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
11-12 (2004); SHANE P. DESSELLE & DAVID P. ZGARRICK, PHARMACY MANAGEMENT: ESSENTIALS
FOR ALL PRACTICE SETTINGS 267 (2005).
26 See WILLIAM N. KELLY, PHARMACY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 266-67 (2d ed. 2007);
Michael J. Dillon, Drug Formulary Management, in MANAGED PHARMACY CARE PRACTICE 145,
145-63 (Robert P. Navarro ed., 2d ed. 2009).
27 S. Glied & K. Janus, Managed Care, in HEALTH SYSTEMS POLICY, FINANCE AND
ORGANIZATION 332 (Guy Carrin et al. eds., 2009).
28 Id.; Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323, 328
(2002). The PBM must carefully balance its interest in charging MCOs the high prices necessary to
earn profits, while still offering more competitive rates than its competitors; if a PBM sets its prices
too high, an MCO will choose another PBM with more aggressive pricing to administer its plan.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 14, at 8. See generally Terry Latanich, Pharmacy Benefit
Manager "Spread": A Reasonable, Rational, Realistic Business Practice, 44 J. AM. PHARMACISTS
Ass'N 10 (2004) (discussing the business considerations surrounding the spread).
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payments received from manufacturers.
A PBM obtains a rebate from a pharmaceutical manufacturer by developing
a preferred list of medications called a "formulary."29 Just as a pharmacy wants
to be included in a PBM's network, a manufacturer seeks to have its drug
included on the PBM's formulary. Having a formulary-listed drug drastically
increases a manufacturer's sales because an MCO either only reimburses patients
for formulary-listed drugs or gives patients great financial incentive to purchase
these drugs over others, such as by offering lower copayments.30 Thus, a
manufacturer will offer a PBM a rebate if the PBM lists the manufacturer's drug
on the formulary over others31 and/or if the PBM is able independently to
increase the manufacturer's market share or sales volume. 32
PBMs supplement the revenue received from both the spread and rebates by
offering a variety of other services. Many of these services increase both
efficiency within the pharmaceutical market and the provision of high-quality
and safe health care services. First, PBMs charge MCOs directly for assisting
pharmacies in checking whether a pharmaceutical poses a threat of drug
interaction; whether a cheaper, generic drug substitute is available; and whether a
consumer is currently eligible for a medication refill.33 Second, PBMs collect,
package, and sell non-identifiable aggregations of data to manufacturers on their
beneficiaries' medication use. 34 Finally, PBMs also administer their own mail-
order pharmacies, allowing them to sell pharmaceuticals directly to consumers
and cut out the middlemen retail pharmacies.36 Independents view this final
practice as suspect, given the potential for conflicts of interest and what
independents see as a serious challenge to health care quality - not to mention
the vitality of the independent pharmacy industry.
In sum, one of the primary ways that a PBM maximizes the spread is by
29 Sandra J. Branda, Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies and Their Quality Implications, in
ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAW 155, 157-59 (John D. Blum ed., 1997)
(providing a general overview of the use of formularies); Sharlow Johnson, supra note 28, at 328-
30. A committee, which is composed of physicians, pharmacists, the plan's medical director, and
external consultants, usually develops a formulary for a PBM based upon factors, including, but not
limited to: cost, efficacy, safety, and patient-compliance rates. Id.
30 BRODY, supra note 17, at 63; David A. Balto, A Whole New World?: Pharmaceutical
Responses to the Managed Care Revolution, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 83, 85 (1997); Andrew S.
Krulwich, The Response to Health Care Reform by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
1, 2-3 (1995); Sharlow Johnson, supra note 28, at 328.
31 Balto, supra note 30, at 85; Krulwich, supra note 30, at 2-3; Navarro, supra note 16, at 41;
Sharlow Johnson, supra note 28, at 330.
32 Navarro, supra note 16, at 41.
33 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 14, at 2.
34 Id. at 7.
35 See infra notes 218-220, 232-236.
36 Michael Johnsrud et al., Comparison of Mail-Order with Community Pharmacy in Plan
Sponsor Cost and Member Cost in Two Large Pharmacy Benefit Plans, 13 J. MANAGED CARE




Rosenthal: Are Independent Pharmacies in Need of Special Care? An Argument A
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
ARE INDEPENDENT PHARMACIES IN NEED OF SPECIAL CARE?
setting low reimbursement rates for pharmacies in exchange for admitting the
pharmacy into the PBM's network. In independents' campaign for an antitrust
exemption, the crux of their complaint is that they are being left out of this
negotiation over reimbursement formulas. While the independent cannot bear to
lose the insurer's tens of thousands of plan subscribers as customers, the PBM
conversely has little incentive to negotiate with the independent. As a result,
PBMs allegedly force independents into contracts of adhesion, leaving them
unable, or just barely able, to cover their costs.
Independents posit that they would be able to "level the playing field" vis-a-
vis the PBMs if they were permitted to band together to negotiate collectively
their reimbursement formulas. In other words, independents could obtain more
favorable reimbursement rates, perhaps equal to or greater than those obtained by
chain pharmacies, if they could together leverage their power to convince the
PBM to raise prices to competitive levels. As the next Part will explain, however,
current antitrust and labor laws prohibit independents from engaging in such
collusion, thus leading them to turn to Congress to circumvent the confines of
antitrust law.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the current legal landscape, which prohibits independents
from banding together to negotiate collectively with PBMs over reimbursement
rates. First, Subsection II.A.1 outlines the antitrust legal framework, highlighting
the goals from which this jurisprudence - at least in its current form - has
sprung. This discussion forms the foundation necessary to understand the later
discussion, in Part III, about both why it makes economical sense for such
collective action to be prohibited and why a legislative exemption would be
antithetical to the values that antitrust law is crafted to protect.
Next, Subsection II.A.2 briefly examines the relevant labor law. It proceeds
to illustrate why independents currently do not fall under the NLRA antitrust
exemption for "employees," the applicability of which would obviate
independents' need for further immunity. Moreover, it explains why an antitrust
exemption does not fit comfortably within the philosophy underlying and the
structure of existing labor jurisprudence.
Having demonstrated that both antitrust and labor laws prohibit collective
action by pharmacists, Section II.B finally presents independents' current
legislative proposals for reform. Specifically, it outlines the history and nature of
the legislative initiatives that independents have championed to permit them to
bypass the constraints that labor and antitrust law currently impose.
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A. The Current Legal Landscape
1. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law is the primary mechanism though which the U.S. legal system
safeguards competition. Cooperation among competing sellers is governed by
section I of the Sherman Act, which declares illegal "[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 37
Implementing this landmark statutory provision, courts have differentiated
between those trade restraints they view as inherently anticompetitive-and thus
illegal per se-and those that they must evaluate under a fact-specific, rule-of-
reason standard. Arrangements treated as per se illegal are those, such as
horizontal price-fixing conspiracies, "whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality." 39 Not per se illegal, however, are agreements "[w]here
the competitive effect of [the] alleged restraint is not readily apparent."4 0 This
latter category of agreements "can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed." 41 A court will allow such an arrangement where the procompetitive
effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the restraint at issue. 42
Since the seminal case United States v. Socony- Vacuum, cartels, or "group[s]
of competitors who have agreed to limit or eliminate their competition in some
economically relevant dimension,"43 have fallen into the former category of per
se illegality. 44 Such agreements are considered "so inherently pernicious that
proof of the actual practice alone carries with it proof of the unreasonableness
and illegality of the restraint." 45 Under this standard, a group of pharmacists who
band together to negotiate collectively with PBMs are effectively limiting or
37 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
38 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 71 (1996).
39 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); see also N.
Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745 (N.D. 111. 2005) ("Per se
treatment is appropriate for a restraint 'that falls into the category of agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
cause or the business excuse for their use."' (citations omitted) (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
40 N. Jackson Pharmacy, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
41 Nat'/ Soc'y ofProf'lEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
42 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 38, at 71.
43 Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive
Realities, and Antitrust Policy, I WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
44 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
45 Murray S. Monroe, Trade and Professional Associations: An Overview of Horizontal
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eliminating competition by fixing prices. This behavior is designated as per se
illegal irrespective of any showing of the actual economic effect of the group's
activities.
While prohibiting pharmacists from forming cartels, current antitrust laws do
allow certain types of collaboration. Under the 1996 Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Healthcare, pharmacies can in many instances form
pharmacy-owned PBM joint ventures, joint buying arrangements for urchasing
pharmaceuticals from wholesalers and manufacturers, and PPOs. Many of
these arrangements are deemed procompetitive47 (and thus legal under antitrust
laws), as they improve efficiencies and health care quality by utilizing electronic
health records and shared support mechanisms. Except for per se illegal
agreements, such as those involving price fixing or boycotts, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) evaluate joint collaboration
on a case-by-case basis under the rule-of-reason standard. 49 The rule-of-reason
46 Janet D. Steiger, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks Before the National
Association of Retail Druggists (Apr. 22, 1996); see also Competition in the Healthcare
Marketplace: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, & Ins. of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 6-7 (2009) [hereinafter Healthcare
Competition Hearing] (statement of Richard A. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission) ("The FTC recognizes that certain forms of collaboration ... have the potential
to foster proconsumer innovations in healthcare organization. . . . Properly applied, antitrust
standards distinguish between price-fixing by healthcare providers, which is likely to increase
costs, and effective clinical integration among providers that has the potential to achieve cost
savings and improve outcomes.").
47 For example, as then-Commissioner, Christine A. Varney, explained as to pharmacy-PBM
joint ventures:
[T]here may be significant procompetitive benefits from the emergence of
pharmacy-owned PBM joint ventures. . . . Absent these ventures, community
pharmacies might be unable to participate in PBMs, and PBM consumers might
have less choice in their selection of a pharmacist.
These ventures may also improve the efficiency and competitiveness of their
members by aggregating buying power. . . . A joint buying group alone could
not achieve these savings, because only a PBM has the power to solicit
discounts based on share shifting (e.g., preferential listing on the formulary).
The savings from the joint buying arrangement should enable community
pharmacies to compete more effectively.
Christine A. Varney, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks Before the Citizens Fund
Conference: The Dangers of Health Industry Consolidation and Corporatization and the Effect on
Quality, Cost and Accessibility (May 10, 1995).
48 See Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 7 (statement of Richard A.
Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission).
49 Id. Furthermore, while typically courts deem most market-allocation, price-fixing, and bid-
rigging agreements to be per se illegal, in the health care context, courts have been very generous in
applying the rule-of-reason standard rather than a per se rule. This is because generally courts
disfavor per se treatment "in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious," Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
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standard considers a variety of factors in determining legality, including: (1)
whether the pharmacies together have market power; (2) whether the activities
produce efficiencies; and (3) whether the collaboration produces anticompetitive
effects that outweigh any associated efficiencies.51
Dissatisfied with options for collaboration under the current antitrust laws,
professionals have argued that the activities of "learned professions" do not
constitute "trade or commerce" within section 1 of the Sherman Act.52 Despite
historical support for such an approach, 53 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the
Supreme Court switched course, ruling that there is no "support for the
proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion" and that "[t]he
nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act" 54 Unable to escape antitrust law's confines through the doctrine of
U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986). This same ambiguity often exists in the health care context. See
DEBORAH HAAS-WILSON, MANAGED CARE AND MONOPOLY POWER: THE ANTITRUST CHALLENGE 77
(2003). Courts particularly rely on this principle in cases implicating medical judgment or health
care quality. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 51 (4th ed.
2010). But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 38, at 3 ("The Agencies
emphasize that it is not their intent to treat such [health] networks either more strictly or more
leniently than joint ventures in other industries, or to favor any particular procompetitive
organization or structure of health care delivery over other forms that consumers may desire.").
50 In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety,
and Insurance, Richard Feinstein, FTC Director of the Bureau of Competition, stated that as long as
a group of health care providers "cannot exercise market power," collaboration "is unlikely to raise
significant antitrust concerns, because it has the potential to benefit consumers rather than harm
them." Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 7 (statement of Richard A. Feinstein,
Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission). Courts have held that under the rule-of-
reason standard, market power, or the power "to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market," such as raise prices and reduce output, is a key consideration in
determining legality. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 36 (2006);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,464 (1992).
51 Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 7 (statement of Richard A. Feinstein,
Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission).
52 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975).
53 William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View ofHealth Care Antitrust, 65 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 249 (2002) ("[M]edical practitioners . . . follow a profession and not a
trade." (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931))); see also United
States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (noting that "there are ethical
considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved
which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters").
54 421 U.S. at 787. The Goldfarb Court ambivalently warned that it might later retreat back to
its historically deferential posture towards professional activity. Id. at 788 n.17 ("The fact that a
restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts that originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We




Rosenthal: Are Independent Pharmacies in Need of Special Care? An Argument A
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
ARE INDEPENDENT PHARMACIES IN NEED OF SPECIAL CARE?
professional immunity, some health care professionals, who fit squarely within
the NLRA's independent-contractor exclusion, have argued instead that they fall
within the labor exemption, which gives private-sector employees the right to
organize.
2. The Labor Exemption
The NLRA gives private-sector employees the "right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 55 To
reconcile the conflicting policies of labor and antitrust, Congress and the courts
have created statutory and non-statutory exemptions to protect labor
organizations and employees engaged in collective-bargaining activities from the
reach of antitrust laws.
Only "employees," defined as those who "work[] for [an employer] for
hire,'58 are protected under the NLRA and thus receive antitrust immunity.
Independent contractors who, in contrast to employees, are "entrusted to
However, "none of the subsequent cases gave any indication that judicial lip service to
professionalism had substantive meaning." Sage & Hammer, supra note 53, at 250.
55 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
56 Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and sections 1, 4, 5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act collectively exempt conduct in which "a bona fide labor organization act[s] in its own self-
interest to further a labor objective, where the union has not combined with a non-labor group."
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 49, at 109 (footnote omitted).
57 The complementary nonstatutory exemption, created by the courts, "protects from
antitrust challenge a labor union's collective bargaining with an employer over wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, as well as the resulting agreements between labor and
management covering these matters." Id. In addition,
[c]ourts have extended the nonstatutory exemption to other concerted activities
and agreements between labor groups and other parties that arise in a collective
bargaining setting, are intimately related to a mandatory subject of bargaining,
and lack the potential to restrain competition in business markets in ways not
flowing naturally from eliminating competition over wages and working
conditions. The nonstatutory exemption also protects multiemployer
agreements in the context of collective bargaining between employers and their
employees.
Id. at 109-10 (footnotes omitted).
58 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is similar to
other federal labor and employment statutes in its circular definition of the term "employee": "[t]he
term 'employee' shall include any employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). As a result of this unhelpful
definition, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts have been charged
with developing a legal definition of the working class and of the employment relationship
conferring membership in it. Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors,
and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 555, 558 (1989).
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undertake a specific project but who [are] left free to do the assigned work and to
choose the method for accomplishing it,,"59 are explicitly excluded from
coverage.60 While there is much controversy over the bounds of the independent-
contractor exception and employers' attempts to squeeze certain groups of
workers within it, independents fit squarely outside the bounds of immunity
under current labor jurisprudence.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) applies the traditional common
law right-to-control test-the same test used to determine vicarious liability in
tort suits 6 to distinguish employees from independent contractors.62 There is
some variation in application, but courts typically balance ten factors laid out in
the Restatement (Second) ofAgency,63 with a particular focus on "the employer's
right to control the physical conduct of the individual." 64 Where an employer has
control over both the manner and means of the worker's labor, a court is likely to
find the worker to be an employee.65 Oppositely, where a worker is able to
59 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (9th ed. 2009).
60 Harvey M. Adelstein & Harry T. Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst:
Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 U. KAN. L. REv. 191, 192
(1969).
61 Myra H. Barron, Who's an Independent Contractor? Who's an Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW.
457,459 (1999).
62 Adelstein & Edwards, supra note 60, at 192-93. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1958) states that "[a] servant [i.e. an employee] is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of services is subject to the other's control or right to control."
63 These factors are:
a. the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
b. whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
c. the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
d. the skill required in a particular occupation;
e. whether the employer or the [worker] supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
f. the length of time for which the person is employed;
g. the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
h. whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
i. whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
j. whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 62, § 220.
64 Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Relations and Title VII, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 75, 80 (1984).
65 See John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not Always
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dictate the circumstances surrounding his employment, a court is likely to find
the worker to be an independent contractor without statutory protection. Under
the factors considered by the NLRA's right-to-control test, pharmacists clearly
constitute independent contractors rather than employees of MCOs or PBMs, and
thus it would be anomalous for a court to bestow upon them the benefit of the
labor exemption under existing labor jurisprudence. Whether one analyzes all ten
factors67 or simply considers control over the manner and means of work,
independent pharmacists are not employees of insurers, but rather are
uncovered independent contractors. MCOs and PBMs restrict neither how
pharmacists design and operate their businesses nor the services pharmacists
provide. Furthermore, pharmacists are free to sell additional products, such as
food and beauty supplies, as well as medication to cash-paying customers,
without insurers' approval. Likewise, insurers play no part in the provision of
ancillary services, such as home delivery, which pharmacists offer without
insurer compensation. While the NLRB has yet to consider formally whether
pharmacists are "employees" of insurers, the NLRB has considered and rejected
a similar argument in the physician-HMO context.69 Given that PBMs exert even
less control over independents than HMOs do over physicians, the chances of the
NLRB or courts construing the definition of "employee" sufficiently broadly to
encompass independents are slim.
Moreover, not only does the labor exemption currently exclude independents
from coverage, but independents' stated goals are in tension with the motivations
and values behind the labor-law framework within which this exemption is
applied has been the common law right to control test. Control has been construed to mean control
of both the result and the 'manner and means' by which the purported employee brings about the
result." (quoting Lorenz Schneider Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 517 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir.
1975))); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 187, 194 (1999).
66 Dowd, supra note 64, at 80-81.
67 See supra note 63.
68 Pharmacists are subject to the same test for employee status as all other workers under the
NLRA. Thus, of course, the NLRB may indeed consider pharmacists working at others'
pharmacies, such as chain stores and supermarkets, to be employees of the stores at which they
work. They, however, still would not be employees of PBMs or insurers.
69 In AmeriHealth Inc./AmeriHealth HMO, 329 N.L.R.B 870 (1999), the NLRB considered
whether a group of primary-care and specialty physicians were employees rather than independent
contractors within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA. Rejecting the argument that the HMO
substantially controlled the physicians' manner and means of work, the NLRB analogized the
relationship to that between an advertising agency and a freelance advertisement photographer, as
contrasted to a master and servant. Id. at 885. That said, the NLRB acknowledged that it was "not
necessarily precluding a finding that physicians under contract to HMOs may, in other
circumstances, be found to be statutory employees." Id. at 870 n. 1. For a more comprehensive
analysis of how physicians have argued that they should be considered to be employees under the
NLRA, see Micah Berman, Note, The "Quality Health Care Coalition Act": Can Antitrust Law
Improve Patient Care?, 53 STAN. L. REv. 695, 707-11 (2000).
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situated. Passed during the New Deal - when policymakers' feared a recurrence
of the Great Depression - the NLRA is geared at bettering employees' wages,
hours, and working conditions; protecting the free flow of commerce by
channeling the disruptive nature of industrial disputes into the collective-
bargaining process; and preventing the recurrence of depressions. 70
Although it may be true that an antitrust exemption for independents would
fulfill some of the NLRA's goals, such arguments do not comport with those
independents currently advance in arguing for an exemption-and thus would
need to be assessed on their own terms. Rather, as explained below, 7 1
independents seeking an antitrust exemption purport to be motivated, at least
primarily, by the desire to restore the market to competitive equilibrium and to
bolster patient welfare and health care quality - not to remedy disruptive
disputes or to improve their own wages, even if at the expense of consumers. The
drafters of the NLRA never intended the Act to address issues concerning
product or service quality, let alone that of the crucial service of health care. As
David Wales of the FTC testified before Congress:
The labor exemption . . . was not created to solve issues
regarding the ultimate safety and quality of patient care. . . . [but]
to raise incomes and improve working conditions of union
70 Section I of the NLRA states in pertinent part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers . . .
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions. . . . Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also United States v. Silk, 331
U.S. 704, 713 (1947) ("The aim of the Act was to remedy the inequality of bargaining power in
controversies over wages, hours and working conditions.").
71 See infra Part Ill.
72 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1839, 112th Cong. (2011); Quality
Health Care Coalition Act of 2011, H.R. 1409, 112th Cong. (2011). In fact, not only is collective
bargaining an inappropriate way to achieve such goals, but relying on collective bargaining to do so
creates a perverse conflict of interests for those engaged in bargaining. If, in their negotiations with
PBMs, pharmacists secured the types of benefits that would assist patients, such as broader
formulary lists and reduced preapproval requirements, they presumably would have to compensate
for these concessions through reductions (or smaller gains) in their own fee schedules and
reimbursement rates. Awkwardly, this position forces pharmacists to choose between their own
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members. The law protects, for example, the United Auto
Workers' [UAW] right to bargain for higher wages and better
working conditions, but we do not rely on the UAW to bargain
for safer, more reliable, or more fuel-efficient cars. Congress has
addressed those types of concerns in other ways, as well as
relying on competition in the market among automobile
manufactures to encourage product improvements.
With little hope of exemption under the NLRA, health care providers,
including independents, have turned to Congress, looking for a legislative basis
for an antitrust exemption.
B. Congressional Proposals for Reform
Supported by a strong pharmacy lobby, several congressmen have
introduced bills proposing antitrust exemptions for independent pharmacies. 74
The year 2005 saw the introduction of the bipartisan Community Pharmacy
Fairness Act of 2005.75 This bill, premised on an effort "[t]o ensure and foster
continued patient safety and quality of care," would have "ma[de] the antitrust
laws apply to negotiations between groups of independent pharmacies and health
plans and health insurance issuers in the same manner as such laws apply to
protected activities under the National Labor Relations Act."76 Limited in that it
exempted federal programs from coverage, 77 the bill was politically popular
with 113 cosponsors, but neither the House nor Senate passed the bill.7
Undeterred, advocates introduced the very similar Community Pharmacy Act of
73 Impact of Our Antitrust Laws on Community Pharmacies and Their Patients: Hearing
Before the Task Force on Antitrust & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 1Oth
Cong. 64 (2007) [hereinafter Community Pharmacies Hearing] (statement of David Wales, Deputy
Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission) (testifying in opposition to the
Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007).
74 See, e.g., Laura Dean, Independent Pharmacists Battle Big Pharma on Health Care,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/05/independent-
pharmacists-b_n_251787.html; Jim Frederick, With New Push, Pharmacy Groups Seek Inclusion in
Health Reform's ACOs, DRUG STORE NEWS, Dec. 7, 2010, http://drugstorenews.com/article/new-
push-pharmacy-groups-seek-inclusion-health-reform's-acos; Press Release, Pharm. Care Mgmt.
Ass'n, Drugstore Lobby Wants New Collective Bargaining Powers, http://pcmanet.org/2012-press-
releases/drugstore-lobby-wants-new-collective-bargaining-powers (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).
75 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1671, 109th Cong. (2005).
76 Id. The bill defined an independent pharmacy as one that is "not owned (or operated) by a
publicly traded company." Id. § 2(h)(3).
77 Id. § 2(g) (exempting, for example, "[t]he Medicaid Program under title XIX of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 1396 et seq.)" and "[tihe SCHIP program under title XXI of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 1397aa et seq.)").
78 See H.R. 1671 (109th): Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2005, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-1671 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
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200779 and the Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 200980 duri the
following two Congresses. Again, the bills were fairly popular with 180 and
9982 cosponsors respectively. While the 2009 iteration never emerged from
committee, 3 the House Committee on the Judiciary favorably received the 2007
version and recommended its passage.84 Despite these strong showings of
support, neither bill became law. 85 More recent iterations of the bill, including
the Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 201186 and the Preserving Our
Hometown Independent Pharmacies Act of 2011, have had less support.
In addition to lobbying for their own exemption, independent pharmacies
also have campaigned with other groups, such as physicians, to press for an
industry-wide exemption for all health care providers. Again, several iterations
of essentially equivalent bills have been introduced in Congress over the years,
with varying degrees of support,89 only eventually to die. The precise reason for
79 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 971, 11 0th Cong. (2007). Note that
Senator John Isakson also unsuccessfully introduced two versions of the Community Pharmacy
Fairness Act of 2007 in the Senate. See Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007, S. 885, 110th
Cong. (2007); Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007, S. 2161, 110th Cong. (2007).
80 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1204, 111 th Cong. (2009).
81 Steve Berberich, Druggists Unite to Speed Payments, GAZETTE (Md.) (July 20, 2007),
http://www.gazette.net/stories/072007/businew211348_32356.shtml.
82 See H.R. 1204 (111th): Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2009, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 11-1204 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
83 Id.
84 For the House Committee on the Judiciary's report, see H.R. REP. No. 110-898 (2008).
85 See H.R. 1204 (111th): Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2009, supra note 82; H.R.
971 (11 Oth): Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-971 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
86 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1839, 112th Cong. (2011). Similarly to
the previous iterations, the bill exempts from antitrust coverage (with some express exclusions)
"[a]ny independent pharmacies who are engaged in negotiations with a health plan regarding the
terms of any contract under which the pharmacies provide health care items or services for which
benefits are provided under such plan." Id. § 2(a).
87 Preserving Our Hometown Independent Pharmacies Act of 2011, H.R. 1946, 112th Cong.
(2011).
88 Health care providers are defined under the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2011 as
those who "provide[] health care items or services, treatment, assistance with activities of daily
living, or medications to patients and who, to the extent required by State or Federal law, possesses
specialized training that confers expertise in the provision of such items or services, treatment,
assistance, or medications." Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2011 § 3(5), H.R. 1409, 112th
Cong. (2011)..
89 While some iterations have been relatively successful - one bipartisan bill passed the
House only to fail in the Senate - others have faced a greater struggle to gain traction. For
example, in 2003, Representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.) introduced a revised Quality Health Care
Coalition Act of 2003 in the House. See Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2003, H.R. 1247,
108th Cong. (2003). This iteration of the bill, similarly to the Community Pharmacy Fairness Acts,
explicitly renounced any impact on the NLRA, stating that "[n]othing in this [bill] shall be
construed as changing or amending any provision of the National Labor Relations Act, or as
affecting the status of any group of persons under that Act." Id. § 3(b)(2). As a result, the bill's
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the bills' respective failures is unclear 90 - and, in the case of the 2009 iteration,
may have had much to do with a lack of support from party leadership given its
failure to be reported out of committee.9 1 Still, it is not implausible that the
failures to pass were motivated by the economic arguments put forth by
opponents of the bills, most notably the FTC, which strongly opposed the bills on
the ground that they would not achieve the procompetitive and health care
quality-enhancing benefits claimed by their supporters.
The statutory language of the most recent version of the bill, the Quality
Health Care Coalition Act of 2011 suggests that, if enacted, it would include in
its ambit both pharmacists working at chain pharmacies and independents. 93 That
said, only independents and their affiliated associations, such as the National
Community Pharmacists Association, have testified on behalf of previous
enjoyed by bargaining units under the NLRA. Instead, it stated: "Any health care professionals who
are engaged in negotiations with a health plan regarding the terms of any [health care] contract ...
shall, in connection with such negotiations, be exempt from the Federal antitrust laws." Id. § 3(a).
Again, the bill exempted many federal programs from its reach, id. § 3(c), but it gained much less
traction than its 1999 predecessor and had only one cosponsor. See 150 CONG. REC. H6997 (daily
ed. Sept. 9, 2004). Undeterred, in 2005, 2007, and 2009, representatives introduced similar bills.
See Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2009, H.R. 1493, 11Ith Cong. (2009) (introduced by
Representatives Paul and Price); Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2007, H.R. 3341, 110th
Cong. (2007); Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2005, H.R. 3074, 109th Cong. (2005). All three
died in committee without hearings. See H.R. 3074 (109th): Quality Health Care Coalition Act of
2005, GovTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl09-3074 (last visited Nov. 13,
2012); H.R. 3341 (110th): Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2007, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-3341 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012); H.R. 1493
(IIIth): Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2009, GovTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-1493 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). On April 7, 2011, Representatives Ron Paul
(R-Tex.), John Conyers (D-Mich.), and Jeff Miller (R-Fla.) introduced yet another iteration of the
bill - this time the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2011. See H.R. 1409. Again, the bill
purports "[t]o ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by clarifying the
application of the antitrust laws to negotiations between groups of health care professionals and
health plans and health care insurance issuers." Id. Like those bills previously introduced by
Representative Paul, it does not intertwine the health care exemption with the NLRA's labor
exemption, keeping the two entirely separate and stating that the bill "shall [not] be construed as
changing or amending any provision of the National Labor Relations Act, or as affecting the status
of any group of persons under that Act." Id. § 2(b)(2). The bill also exempts several federal
programs from its reach. Id. § 2(c).
90 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV.
67, 99 (1988) (arguing that because there are a "variety of reasons, unrelated to the merits or
legislative support, for the failure of an idea or a measure in Congress," little can be concluded
from legislative inaction).
91 See generally id. ("The legislative agenda is severely limited; to gain a place on that
agenda, a measure must not only have substantial support, but be considered urgent by key people
(such as the President and/or the party leadership in Congress). . . . A bill can effectively be killed
by a hostile committee or subcommittee chair in either chamber.").
92 See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text; infra note 141 and accompanying text.
93 H.R. 1409. The text of the bill simply refers to all "health care professionals," id. pmbl., §
2, and does not contain a provision exempting providers in excess of a given size. But see, e.g.,
Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1839, 112th Cong. § 2(i)(3) (2011).
215
18
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/4
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
versions of the bill, and the impact on larger pharmacies has been under-
scrutinized. This is not surprising, as an antitrust exemption for Wal-Mart and
Rite Aid to join together and collectively bargain with MCOs presumably would
be politically unpopular.
Although no bill has yet become law and more recent iterations have
enjoyed less success than those before them, the almost uninterrupted
introduction of these bills, the tenacious lobby advocating their passage, and their
bipartisan support and periods of near-success demonstrate that an antitrust
exemption is a live, important issue deserving of serious scholarly attention. The
next Part explores the substantive arguments for and against a legislative antitrust
exemption to evaluate whether such protective legislation is warranted. After
considering the economic realities of the pharmaceutical supply chain,
conventional economic theory, and the principles underlying antitrust regulation,
this Note concludes that these congressional proposals have, at least for now, met
their proper fate.
III. ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Certain antitrust exemptions, such as the labor exemption, are premised, at
least in part, on the idea that the market at issue should be removed from the
bounds of competition to achieve some ancillary societal goal at the expense of
economic efficiency. 94 In contrast, independents have met antitrust doctrine on
its own terms. In other words, independents have not argued that the health care
market should eschew economic efficiency as its overarching goal; rather,
independents have argued that market imperfections prohibit unrestrained
competition from best achieving this goal of efficiency. Specifically, the crux of
independents' argument is that an exemption would counteract failures and
imperfections in the pharmaceutical market and that this improvement, in turn,
would increase health care quality at equal or lower cost to consumers. This Part
argues, however, that conventional economic theory and empirical data predict
otherwise. Section III.A responds to independents' claim that an exemption
definitively would not increase health care costs. Section III.B addresses
independents' argument that an exemption would increase consumers' quality of
health care irrespective of any cost increases. After concluding that both of the
arguments advanced by independent pharmacies are flawed, this Note reasons
that an antitrust exemption is not wisely grounded in economic policy.
A. Market Price and Health Care Costs
Independents' first argument for an exemption is premised on the notion that
94 For example, the labor exemption is largely premised not on economic arguments but
rather on the principle that human labor is not a commodity. See Harry Shulman, Labor and the
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the pharmaceutical market suffers from heavily entrenched PBM monopsony,
"[a] market situation in which one buyer controls the market." 95 They allege that
allowing independents to counteract this anticompetitive market power would
bring the market back into equilibrium, keeping independents in business without
passing additional costs on to consumers. Subsection III.A. 1 applies conventional
economic theory to show how an antitrust exemption for independents effectively
would legitimize the formation of a sellers' cartel and likely increase health care
costs. Following a description of the argument of countervailing market power in
Subsection III.A.2, Subsection III.A.3 concludes that an antitrust exemption
cannot be justified on the ground that the creation of a bilateral monopoly would
reduce the harmful effects of PBMs' aggregation of market power. Finally,
Subsection III.A.4 reinforces this economic analysis by showing that existing
empirical data supports the conclusion that an exemption indeed would raise
costs as conventional economic models predict.
1. Antitrust Doctrine and Sellers' Cartels
Today, the foremost policy of U.S. antitrust law has become the protection
of "competition, not competitors."96 As such, it prohibits cartelization activities,
such as collective-bargaining agreements, which seek to immunize certain
competitors from market forces at the expense of consumer welfare. Because the
collective bargaining of independent pharmacies falls directly within the scope of
this prohibition, the cartelization of independents would contravene the current
policy underlying antitrust laws, such as that driving the enforcement of the
95 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 1098. By way of elaboration, Black's Law
Dictionary quotes LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 137-38 (2000):
Monopsony is often thought of as the flip side of monopoly. A monopolist is a
seller with no rivals; a monopsonist is a buyer with no rivals. A monopolist has
power over price exercised by limiting output. A monopsonist also has power
over price, but this power is exercised by limiting aggregate purchases.
Monopsony injures efficient allocation by reducing the quantity of the input
product or service below the efficient level.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 1098.
96 It is ironic that this phrase, "competition, not competitors" has come to stand for modem
antitrust policy of protecting consumer welfare and economic efficiency, given that the Supreme
Court first used this phrase in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), a case
that is criticized today as doing exactly the opposite: protecting small, locally owned businesses at
the expense of economic efficiency. As the meaning behind the phrase has evolved over time,
however, the Court has quoted this Brown Shoe language in numerous widely cited antitrust
opinions of the modem era, including Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 906 (2007); Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14
(1997); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993);
Atlantic Ritchfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); and Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
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Sherman Act.
During the Warren Court era of the 1960s, antitrust law often focused on the
protection of small business to the detriment of economic efficiency. 97 The 1970s
and 1980s however, witnessed a shift in policy to the "Chicago School" line of
thinking, which views consumer welfare as the sole legitimate objective of
99
antitrust. In his canonical book, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork put forth a
multifaceted argument supporting the principle that the antitrust laws' statutory
language, legislative history, and structural features all point towards consumer
welfare being the only tenable criterion on which antitrust should rest.100
Moreover, Bork maintained that the goal of consumer welfare as a legislative
policy best "renders the law internally consistent," "makes for ease of judicial
administration,"o and "permits courts to behave responsibly and to achieve the
virtues appropriate to law."102
103Under traditional economic theory, consumer welfare is highest when the
97 This populist ideology is embodied by Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion:
[G]reat industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their
economic results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself in the
passage quoted in the margin showed that among the purposes of Congress in
1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the
helplessness of the individual before them. . . . Throughout the history of these
statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945); see also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51-52 (10th prtg. 1993) (quoting
from the above Alcoa passage in discussing court opinions championing "[v]alues in conflict with
consumer welfare").
98 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks: Looking Forward: The
Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy 10-11 (Dec.
10, 2002).
99 See BORK, supra note 97, at 51; see also Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust
Policy: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 239 (1999).
100 BORK, supra note 97, at 56-69.
101 Id. at 69.
102 Id. at 89. Another scholar who has vigorously championed consumer welfare as antitrust's
only guiding policy concern is Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit. Posner rejects
populist concerns surrounding antitrust law, questioning smallness as a virtue and the merit of
noneconomic arguments. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that
there is no "justification for using the antitrust laws to attain goals unrelated or antithetical to
efficiency, such as promoting a society of small tradespeople, a goal that whatever its intrinsic (and
very dubious) merit cannot be attained within the framework of antitrust principles and
procedures").
103 It is important to note that the term "consumer welfare" is a bit of a misnomer. The key
inquiry is the total effect of consumer and producer surplus-not just that of consumers. See J.
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market operates under perfectly competitive, and thus non-regulated,
conditions.104 Under perfect competition, the intersection of the market demand
and the market supply curves determines the competitive market price and
output. Each individual seller is a "price taker" in that it takes the market price as
given and cannot unilaterally change the price of its goods by withholding or
increasing output. os Applying this model to the pharmaceutical industry, an
individual pharmacist in a competitive market cannot unilaterally influence
reimbursement rates or the quantity of sold pharmaceuticals. From an allocative
efficiency standpoint, this outcome is socially optimal, maximizing the sum of
consumer and producer surplus.106
In contrast to the price-taking seller in a competitive regime, a cartel acts
like a multiplant monopoly,' 0 7 with an ability to determine market price through
restricting quantity. Because a monopolist is the only seller in the market, it faces
the market's downward-sloping demand curve. Therefore, while the competitive
seller's output is determined only by the price that he can demand for each unit,
Weyerhaeuser, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 353, 355 ("Judge Bork, like other Chicago School
adherents, believed that consumer welfare could only be maximized when total (societal) surplus
was maximized. In his view, antitrust policy and rules should guard against all practices and
transactions creating allocative inefficiencies; thus, the antitrust laws could and would facilitate the
maximization for consumer wealth in the aggregate without regard to distribution."). Although this
Note proceeds using this definition of consumer welfare - that of allocative efficiency - it is
important to recognize that this view is not shared by all. See id. at 354 ("To some, consumer
welfare focuses on the effects of the anticompetitive conduct on consumers in the relevant market.
According to this view, antitrust liability ultimately turns on whether the seller will have market
power over consumers purchasing the output in the relevant market."). Still, many have noted that
the precise definition of this term "is largely an academic debate with no real world impact because
there is very little difference between the two standards." Id. at 355; see also Thomas 0. Barnett,
Substantial Lessening of Competition-The Section 7 Standard, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 293,
297 ("[T]he consumer welfare and total welfare standards can diverge, although I think it is a rare
case in practice."). Although many of the same arguments would apply, a full explanation as to
how the theoretical economic analysis would diverge when one definition is substituted for the
other is beyond the scope of this Note.
104 See MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONS,
EXPERTISE & POLICY CHANGE 116 (1991) ("The ascendence of the Chicago school also shaped the
prevailing understanding of policy by virtue of its faith in the self-sufficiency of markets and its
distinct antistatism. As noted earlier, the fundamental assumption underlying this position is that
the most efficient level of activity is the market. Managers tend to act rationally, seeking out new
and greater efficiencies as a means of maximizing profits.").
105 See Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 524
(1984).
106 Id. at 525 ("Monopoly means that society will have the wrong mix of products in the
sense that a different mix would make consumers happier.").
107 A multiplant monopoly is where a monopolist has more than one plant, among which it
allocates its production. See RICHARD LIPSEY & ALEC CHRYSTAL, ECONOMICS 159 (12th ed. 2007).
When one "assum[es] that 100 percent of the sales of a good are incorporated into the cartel," the
cartel can be treated "as a multiplant monopoly, where the member firms are analogous to the
plants operated by a monopolist." STEPHEN MATHIS & JANET KOSCIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 447 (2002).
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"[fjor the monopolist, the decision to sell an additional unit of output is
determined not merely by the price he can demand for that unit alone, but also
the fact that each additional unit sold drives down the price he receives for all the
other units he sells."los Because to increase sales, the monopolist must lower the
price for all units sold, the monopolist's revenue curve is downward sloping and
lies underneath the demand curve. Accordingly, when maximizing profits by
producing at the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost, 109 the
monopolist will sell a lower quantity of output at a higher price than that which it
would under competitive conditions. 1o
When competitors join together and centralize decision-making to engage in
collective bargaining, they can act essentially as a single firm and thus achieve
the anticompetitive results just described of a single-seller monopoly. I' Because
consumer welfare is impaired by such an agfregation of seller power, U.S.
antitrust laws declare cartelization per se illegal. As explained earlier, when an
agreement is considered illegal per se, the actual effects on price and output of
the good or service at hand are irrelevant to the court's analysis because these
agreements are considered to be "so 'plainly anticompetitive,' and so often
'lack[in .... any redeeming virtue,' that they are conclusively presumed
illegal."
Current U.S. antitrust policy - in attempting to "maximize consumer
welfare by promoting the efficient use of scarce resources" 114 - is at odds with
laws that "protect individual competitors from the consequences of normal
market forces from aggressive competition by others, [or] from more efficient
competitors." f Since focusing on consumer welfare as the guiding principle of
108 Laura Alexander, Note, Monopsony and the Consumer Harm Standard, 95 GEO. L.J.
1611, 1616 (2007).
109 Analogously to a monopolist, a cartel, which is made up of multiple sellers, will restrict
the output of every member firm in the cartel so that the marginal cost of production for every
member firm is equal to marginal revenue.
I 10 Areeda, supra note 105, at 525.
111 Id. at 527.
112 See BORK, supra note 97, at 66-67.
113 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
114 The efficient use of resources in a competitive market results in "high output, low prices,
high quality, varied services, access, innovation, and efficiency in production and distribution."
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 49, at 8.
115 Id. at 8. As Judge Posner has explained,
Antitrust enforcement is not only an ineffectual, but a perverse, instrument for
trying to promote the interests of small business as a whole. Antitrust
objectives and the objectives of small business people are incompatible at a
very fundamental level. The best overall antitrust policy from a small-business
standpoint is no antitrust policy. By driving a wedge between the prices and
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antitrust, the Supreme Court explicitly has rejected the theory that courts should
protect or subsidize inefficient small firms at the expense of a more efficient
allocation of resources that flows from free-market conditions.116 Instead,
antitrust law seeks to stimulate, rather than retard, competition in order to "lower
prices, encourage[] greater innovation, and generate[] faster responses by
business to changing consumer needs and desires." 1 17
Applying this model to the health care industry, an exemption that would
allow pharmacy owners who were formerly in competition with each other to
cartelize by collectively negotiating pharmaceutical reimbursement rates would
sacrifice consumer welfare for that of small business. Such an approach would
fly directly in the face of our current antitrust policy, which is rooted in a concern
for consumer welfare. First, pharmacists would prosper at the expense of PBMs
and consumers. In effect, PBMs would have to pay higher reimbursement rates to
pharmacists, which PBMs then would demand from MCOs. MCOs would, in
turn, pass these added costs on to plan subscribers (the consumers) through
higher insurance premiums. Second, because pharmacists would not only
increase prices, but also would sell a lower than allocatively efficient level of
output, resources would not be "automatically funneled into the production of
goods consumers find most valuable."1 18 In economic terms, while pharmacists
would be made better off as a result of cartelization, they would not be made
sufficiently better off to compensate for the accompanied loss in welfare of
consumers.
Because it is important both to society as a whole and to individual patients
in particular that pharmaceuticals are not sold in suboptimal quantities or at
above-optimal prices, increased costs and decreased output are particularly
troubling. Conventional microeconomic theory dictates that when faced with cost
increases, patients almost certainly will fill fewer prescriptions. A large body of
research in both the United States and Canada has correlated increased
copayments and associated prescription costs with prescription noncompliance
and reduced drug use. 119 At least one study has found that the primary reason for
to survive even if their costs are higher than those of the large firms. The only
kind of antitrust policy that would benefit small business would be one that
sought to prevent large firms from underpricing less efficient small firms by
sharing their lower costs with consumers in the form of lower prices. Apart
from raising in acute form the question whether society should promote small
business at the expense of the consumer, such a policy would be unworkable.
POSNER, supra note 102, at 26.
116 BORK, supra note 97, at 56.
117 Muris, supra note 98.
118 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFRREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 24 (4th ed. 2003).
119 Rachel A. Elliot et al., Understanding Medication Compliance and Persistence from an
Economics Perspective, II VALUE IN HEALTH 600, 602 (2008).
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unfulfilled prescriptions among Medicare beneficiaries is medication cost.' 20
Unfortunately, cost increases are most likely to impact populations with the least
income and job security, such as the poor and elderly, who are also the
populations most prone to disease. 12 The failure to follow through with needed
medication only serves to further strain our health care system; researchers
consistently have found that prescription nonadherence is associated with
increased total health care costs, 22 poorer health care outcomes, and greater use
of urgent care and inpatient health facilities. 123
In sum, under the conventional economic models on which antitrust doctrine
is predicated, by allowing pharmacists to boycott collectively any PBM or insurer
that fails to meet fee demands, the proposed exemption would increase
pharmaceutical prices by raising fees paid to smaller, more inefficient
pharmacies at the expense of consumers' pocketbooks. Independents counter,
however, that while conventional antitrust doctrine assumes a perfectly
competitive market, the pharmaceutical supply chain is rife with market
imperfections, particularly PBMs' exertion of market power. The next
Subsection will evaluate independents' argument that traditional economic
analysis is inapplicable because the idealized economic model does not
accurately reflect the nature of the competition in the pharmaceutical market.
2. The Argument of Countervailing Market Power in Response to
Monopsony
Theoretically, negotiations of the reimbursement schedule between
pharmacists and PBMs should occur within a competitive market, with no
individual PBM - and also no individual pharmacist - unilaterally being able
120 See Jae Kennedy et al., Unfilled Prescriptions of Medicare Beneficiaries: Prevalence,
Reasons, and Types ofMedicines Prescribed, 14 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 553 (2008) (finding
that of a sample of 1.6 million Medicare beneficiaries who did not fill their prescriptions, 55.5%
stated their failure to do so was due to the fact that they "thought it would cost too much" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
121 See, e.g., Ira B. Wilson et al., Cost-Related Skipping of Medications and Other Treatments
Among Medicare Beneficiaries Between 1998 and 2000: Results of a National Study, 20 1. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 715, 720 (2005) ("[C]ost-related skipping of medications and other treatments is
associated with several different factors, including poverty and poor health. If a prescription drug
plan requires significant cost sharing, certain vulnerable subgroups will almost certainly continue to
experience relatively high cost-related medication skipping rates, particularly low-income seniors
whose income or assets may not qualify for any low-income subsidies because their income or
assets make them ineligible.").
122 Researchers have found that medication adherence results in overall health care savings
even when accounting for the increased costs associated with patients purchasing needed
medications. M. Christopher Roebuck et al., Medication Adherence Leads to Lower Health Care
Use and Costs Despite Increased Drug Spending, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 91,91 (2011).
123 Id.; see also Elliot et al., supra note 119, at 602 (stating that reduced drug use associated
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to affect the market price of a given quantity of medication.124 As demonstrated
by various complaints filed by pharmacists in federal district court against
MCOs, however, independents allege that this illustration of a perfectly
competitive pharmaceutical market does not reflect the actual market in which
negotiations between an independent pharmacy and a PBM occur. According to
independents, a handful of PBMs, who would individually be price-takers in a
competitive regime, control the market and are able to force below-market prices
125
on independents in their negotiations for reimbursement rates. This allows
them to circumvent true negotiation, which should result in competitive prices.1 26
Instead, a PBM can force a reimbursement rate on an independent that is not only
"far below" that which "would apply in a true competitive market," but also
"generally below any measure of [an] Independent Pharmacist's actual costs
including their variable, marginal, and/or actual costs.",127 As a result, "fewer
goods are transacted, wealth is transferred from the party without market power
[(i.e., the seller)] to the party with market power [(i.e., the buyer)], and there is a
loss of social welfare."128
Independents argue that they can effectively counteract PBMs' monopsony
power-and thus restore the market to competitive equilibrium-by exerting
countervailing market power through a bilateral monopoly-a market
characterized by the possession of market power by both sellers and buyers.129
Theoretically, facilitating a bilateral monopoly does counteract to some extent
the effects of a monopsony power. Because "the buyer and seller" are unable
"simultaneously . . . [to] exploit their respective market power,"l30 meaning that
124 For an economic analysis of buyer behavior in a competitive market, see James Murphy
Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer Practices in Input Markets, 76
B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1081-84 (1996).
125 See Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 28-36 (statement of David Balto,
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).
126 In addition to extracting below-competitive market prices, PBMs allegedly also use their
market power to compel pharmacists to bear additional costs, such as forcing them to buy software
from the PBM and charging them for processing fees. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants
Caremark RX, Inc. and Caremark Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class
Action Complaint at 5, N. Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 1, 2004) (l:04-CV-05674), 2004 WL 5549836.
127 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Class Certification at 15, N. Jackson Pharmacy,
Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d. 740 (CV 03-HS-2696-NE, CV 03-HS-2697-NE), 2005 WL 2016439 (making
such allegations). This can be contrasted to "conditions of perfect competition," under which "a
firm always maximizes profits (or minimizes losses) by producing that output at which its marginal
cost equals the market price. This occurs because the perfectly competitive firm accepts the market
price as given since it is, by definition, too small to affect market price by any variations in output."
Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 702 (1975).
128 Alexander, supra note 108, at 1614.
129 See JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY 75-76 (4th ed. 2009)
(explaining the economics of a bilateral monopoly).
130 Blair & Boylston Herndon, supra note I1, at 1006.
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neither the monopolist nor the monopsonist outcome is tenable, some
accommodation is necessary. Accordingly, profit incentives force the seller and
buyer to cooperate, either in the form of vertical integration or through the
bargaining process.13 If done through the latter, by making a credible threat of
refusal to sell unless the buyer raises prices, the now legalized sellers' cartel will
be able to move price and output to competitive or near competitive levels.132 As
a result of this negotiation, consumers are better off than had the monopsony
conditions alone prevailed.
In making this argument, independents do not dispute that the same result
could be achieved through vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws against PBMs'
alleged monopsony power. Independents claim, however, that federal law
enforcement essentially has "dropped the ball" in bringing action against
monopsonist PBMs. As a result, monopsonist PBMs continue to use market
power to engage in anticompetitive activity 133 offering independents
unfavorable terms through contracts of adhesion. I 4 Independents argue that by
exerting countervailing market power through an antitrust exemption, they will
act procompetitively by bringing reimbursements in line with competitive
levels.13 5 In response to the objection that these additional costs would be passed
through higher insurance rates on to consumers, independents argue that PBMs
already are extracting supracompetitive profits through their exercise of market
power. Because "PBMs have great flexibility in determining how much they shift
over to patients and taxpayers,"'136 any decision to increase rates as a result
would be "strictly a decision of the PBM."l 37 As discussed in the Subsections
that follow, however, the argument advanced by independents rests on faulty
assumptions that are belied by empirical evidence.
131 ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMics 128
(2010).
132 Cf Carstensen, supra note 43, at 25-26 ("[I]f a group of small, powerless buyers face a
monopoly or oligopoly supplier, then individually they are powerless to bargain for better prices
and larger outputs. The small buyers are compelled to pay the monopoly or oligopoly price
demanded by the sellers. However, if these individual buyers can group together and make a
credible threat that they would withhold their purchases unless lower prices and greater quantity
were offered, they might succeed in bargaining down prices and increasing output.... such that the
market moves toward the price and output that would exist if the industry was competitive.").
133 Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 28, 30-31 (statement of David Balto,
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).
134 Id.
135 Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 15 (statement of Mike James, Vice
President, Association of Community Pharmacies Congressional Network & Pharmacist/Owner,
Person St. Pharmacy, Raleigh, N.C.); Leo Mallard, Give Local Pharmacies a Level Playing Field,
BALTIMORE SUN, July, 8, 2007, at 19A.
136 Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 15.
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3. Questioning Independents' Assumptions: PBM Monopsony
The argument of countervailing market power rests on three fundamental
assumptions. First, PBMs exercise unequal bargaining power vis-a-vis
pharmacists. Second, this power translates into a decrease in consumer welfare as
defined by antitrust law. And third, the most effective way for independents to
counteract the anticompetitive effects of PBM monopsony and restore the market
to competitive equilibrium is to cartelize. Examining each of these assumptions
in turn, this Subsection challenges the claim that there is sufficient evidence that
PBMs exercise monopsony power, which necessarily translates into a decrease in
consumer welfare. Moreover, this Subsection asserts that even accepting
independents' claim of inefficient monopsony, Congress would be remiss to
remedy this market failure by sanctioning collective bargaining for the purpose
of creating a bilateral monopoly.
a. Extent ofMonopsony Power Among PBMs
The first dubious assumption on which independents' argument rests is that
138there is sufficient evidence that PBMs have monopsonistic power in the
pharmaceutical market to support such drastic legislative action. 39 Although the
pharmacy lobby claims that the PBM market is "tremendously concentrated," 1 40
a strong body of evidence points in the opposite direction. Supporters of an
exemption emphasize that there are only a couple of PBMs controlling the
market, but this claim fails to account for the fact that FTC-promulgated statistics
reflect that "[t]here are approximately 40 to 50 PBMs operating in the United
States," not just a few.141 Without the critical assumption of overly concentrated
PBM market, the countervailing market-power argument is a nonstarter.
138 By alleging that a handful of PBMs control the market - rather than a single
monopsonistic firm - pharmacists are in actuality referring to an oligopsony rather than a
monopsony. That said, for simplicity (and because independents often still use the word
"monopsony," albeit incorrectly, to refer to PBMs' behavior), "monopsony" is used throughout the
Note.
139 While, historically, antitrust law chiefly has focused on anticompetitive agreements
among sellers, "buying power, is economically objectionable for the same policy reasons that
underlie antitrust's opposition to monopoly." Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint
Purchasing of Health Care, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 409,411. Instead of focusing on the output side of
the market, however, as a monopolist would do, a monopsonist, or buyers' cartel, focuses on the
input side of the market. Accordingly, the fundamental objective is the mirror image of a
monopolist's: "to eliminate competition in some aspect of their input purchasers in order to reduce
the prices associated with such purchases or otherwise control supplier conduct." Carstensen, supra
note 43, at 9-10. In short, a monopsonist, exerting its market power, extracts goods from a seller at
lower than competitive price.
140 Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 28 (statement of David Balto, Senior
Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/4
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Additionally, existing economic models, empirical data, and anecdotal
evidence support the view that independents' bargaining leverage may not be as
low as independents suggest. One economic study found that during the time
period studied, "independents themselves apear[ed] to have greater bargaining
power individually than chain pharmacies." One explanation for this might be
that certain laws not only prohibit health plans from offering mail order as an
only option,143 but also provide that consumers must be able to frequent a certain
number of pharmacies in a given geographical area. 144 In rural areas, where there
are limited numbers of pharmacies, many of which are independent, a PBM
theoretically may be forced to accept whatever terms the independent
demands.' 4 5 Additionally, there have been reports suggesting that the contract-
of-adhesion model does not reflect reality; independent pharmacies have in fact
rejected proposed insurer contracts due to low reimbursement rates rather than
blindly accepted the rates offered, regardless of how meager.146
Moreover, that PBMs are forcing pharmacists to agree to reimbursement
rates below costs defies economic logic. As Caremark Rx, Inc. and Caremark
Inc. remarked in response to antitrust litigation brought by two plaintiff
pharmacies:
If, in fact, reimbursement rates were below their 'marginal,
variable and/or actual costs' as Plaintiffs allege, no rational
business person would seek to 'receive a greater volume of
business' at such rates. The fact that Plaintiffs have continued to
enter into those contracts belies the contention that
reimbursement rates are below their costs. 147
142 John M. Brooks et al., Factors Affecting Bargaining Outcomes Between Pharmacies and
Insurers, 34 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 439, 448 (1999).
143 See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
144 Preserving Our Hometown Independent Pharmacies Act of 2011: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, & the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
I12th Cong. 53 (2012) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission) ("I just want to make the point that there are places in those networks where they
have to deal with independent pharmacies, because there are rural locations, for example, where the
independent pharmacies may be the only one [sic] in a town."); id. at 141 n.31 (statement of Peter
J. Rankin et al., Charles River Associates International).
145 See supra note 144.
146 Brooks et al., supra note 142, at 440; Andrea Radford et al., The Experience of Sole
Community Rural Independent Pharmacies with Medicare Part D: Reports from the Field 2, 9
(N.C. Rural Health Research & Policy Analysis Ctr. & RPRI Ctr. for Rural Health Policy Analysis,
Working Paper No. 87, Policy Paper P2006-3, 2006), available at
http://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/rural/ pubs/report/WP87.pdf.
147 Motion of Caremark Rx, Inc. & Caremark Inc. To Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint, at I1, N. Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (ND. Ill.
Oct. 1, 2004) (1:04-CV-05674), 2004 WL 5549835 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the case was not
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It is dubious that independents would agree to reimbursement rates below
their costs, forcing them to operate at a lossl48 (unless for instance, the
independents believed such losses would only be short term). Moreover, such a
strategy may be contrary to PBMs' own interests given its potential to force all of
their suppliers out of business. Finally, evidence shows that at least a group of
independents remain profitable. In the congressional hearings on the Community
Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007, Charles River Associates (CRA) International, a
leading global consulting firm, presented evidence that in 2005, independent
pharmacies enjoyed, on average, a gross profit margin rate of 19.3% on sales to
commercial insurers, including Medicare managed care plans.149 Not only did
this figure increase 1.5% from the previous year, but this growth also coincided
with an increase in independents' overall gross profit margin on prescriptions
from 21.2% in 2004 to 22.7% in 2005.150 Moreover, in 2003, the number of
independent pharmacies increased by over 400, which CRA International
testified "would have been unlikely to occur had the market for their services not
been profitable."'15  Again in 2008, independently owned community
pharmacies' total sales increased on average by 7.6%, amounting to $3.9
- . 152
million.
Finally, to the extent that concentrations of market power do exist, the FTC
and DOJ vigilantly have worked to break up and monitor aggregations of market
power in the insurance industry. One way in which the FTC has done so is by
Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2009) (reinstating a district-court order compelling
arbitration).
148 Motion To Dismiss, supra note 147, at 11.
149 Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 30 (statement of Peter J. Rankin,
Principal, Charles River Associates International).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 31. Moreover, at least some of the pharmacies that are closing have not folded from
bankruptcy but rather have sold their businesses for a profit. See Chain Drug Stocks on Upswing,
CHAIN DRUG REV., June 30, 2008, at 23 (quoting research analyst as saying "[p]harmacy operations
are expected to be a key focus, reflecting what we see as CVS's ability to succeed in the rapidly
growing managed care arena and its ongoing purchase of prescription files from independent
pharmacies" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Andrea Chang, Big Chains a Headache for Small
Drugstores, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/08/business/fi-
drugstore8 (quoting a pharmacy owner as saying, "We get offers, I would say probably not every
week, but at least once or twice a month.. .. Usually it's just a little feeler-type letter: 'Why don't
you sell to us now while you still can make some money?"' (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ralph de la Cruz, Independent Drugstores: Going, Gone?, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Oct.
23, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 1402045 ("'Chain stores are coming into the independent
market and making very attractive offers,' Tilley said. Tilley, who owns Zweber Apothecary
pharmacies, said he's been approached five times by chains."). These confounders cast doubt on
the independent pharmacists' arguments that the magnitude of closures reveals an inability of
independents to compete with chains or mail-order pharmacies.
152 Jim Frederick, Facing Economy, Indy Pharmacists Stand Firm, DRUG STORE NEWS, Nov.
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proactively reviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions that potentially could
threaten competition in the health care industry. For example, in 2004, the FTC
investigated Caremark Rx's proposed acquisition of Advance PCS.15 3  In
approving the transaction, and thus closing its investigation, the FTC found that
post-merger Caremark Rx would continue to face robust competition from
Medco and Express Scripts (two other national PBMs) as well as several other
health plans and retail pharmacy chains offering PBM services. 154 Moreover, the
FTC concluded that "there [was] no reason to expect a monopsony or oligopsony
outcome . . . even if the acquisition enable[d] the merged PBM (or PBMs as a
group) to reduce the dispensing fees they pay to retail pharmacies."i 55 The FTC
based this finding on the fact that (1) each PBM negotiated contracts individually
with each retail pharmacy company and that (2) "the post-acquisition share of the
merged firm for all purchases of prescription dispensing services would be below
the level at which an exercise of monopsony power [was] likely to be
profitable."l 56 Other PBMs have not fared as well as Caremark Rx and Advance
PCS when faced with FTC scrutiny; several FTC investigations of PBM activity
have resulted in consent orders restricting the transactions.157
When one recognizes the flaws inherent in independents' claims, it becomes
clear that larger chains are driving some smaller, independent pharmacies out of
business not because of some inherent market unfairness, but rather because
larger pharmacies, including those owned by chain stores and supermarkets,
benefit from economies of scale, which allow them to offer the same
pharmaceuticals at lower prices. 158 Independents themselves have attributed their
153 Caremark Rx, Inc./AdvancePCS, F.T.C. File No. 031-0239, (Feb. 11, 2004 (statement of




157 For example, in Merck & Co., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 156, 159 (1999), the FTC found that when
Merck (a leading pharmaceutical manufacturer) acquired Medco (a PBM), it substantially lessened
competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006), and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. As a result, the FTC
issued a consent order directing Merck and Medco to maintain and disclose an open formulary with
information regarding the relative costs of listed drugs and prohibiting them from communicating
proprietary and other nonpublic information. Merck, 127 F.T.C. at 162, 164.
158 Chang, supra note 151, at 1. Consolidation in the drugstore industry is driven in part by
the cost savings that can be found when different functions, such as distribution, purchasing and
management, are combined."); see also Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 2
(statement of Rep. John Conyers) ("We are told and we will hear today, how they are being driven
out of business because they can't compete with large retail pharmacies and cannot survive with the
low reimbursement rates that are given to them now. . . . [S]mall pharmacies have suffered because
of higher administrative costs, approximately some $15 billion a year."). According to one 2008
study, "independent drugstores in the state of Florida charged an average of 15 percent more for
four widely used prescription drugs than the statewide average." New Study: Independent
Drugstores Charge 15% More for Prescription Drugs; New 'Collective Bargaining' Rights Would
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market struggles to the fact that they cannot compete with chains' competitive
prices. Although much of this may very well be attributed to greater average
bargaining power (at least in certain markets), there may be other explanations as
well. For example, one reporter quoted an independent pharmacy owner as
candidly admitting that "[a] chain store can afford to sell prescription drugs at
lower prices, because once they get a customer in the store, they can make money
selling them thousands of other products. Most independent pharmacists do not
have that luxury."l 59 Chain stores benefit from more efficient computer
systems, 16 high-tech dispensing technology,161 and the ability conveniently to
offer consumers the opportunity to buy a wide variety of "front end" items, such
as beauty supplies and toiletries.162 By saving labor costs and procuring revenue
from additional products, chains offer consumers lower prescription prices
irrespective of any bargaining-power differential. Again, this is not to say that
such a differential does not exist, just that it is unclear to what extent lower prices
are a result of greater bargaining leverage stemming from greater market share.
Thus, at a minimum, a legislative exemption would be a blunt tool to address this
perceived problem. The evidence that PBMs benefit from monopsony and that
they use this aggregation of market power to drive independents out of business
is too speculative to support legislative reform.
b. Impact on Consumer Welfare
The second major assumption on which independents' arguments rest is that
PBMs' and chain pharmacies' monopsony power translates into higher prices and
lower output, or, in economic terms, a reduction in allocative efficiency. Even if
159 Mark Mandemach, A Dose of Reality: Independent Pharmacy Chains Fight for Survival,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Apr. 3, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-04-03/features/
9404030199 1 independent-pharmacies-suburbs-fill.
160 Eric Fisher, Pharmacy Veteran Helps Small Stores Fight Chains, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1997, at D20 ("A major hurdle in competing with national chains remains technology. Each of the
nationals has an integrated computer system to transmit customer information. Care Drug stores [a
smaller, local chain] use nine different software configurations.").
161 See Chris Birk, Service, Technology Are Keeping Mom-and-Pop Stores Alive, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, July 9, 2008, at Cl.
162 According to a reporter, one pharmacist complained: "I don't sell televisions, tires, motor
oil or fruits and vegetables. . . . There's nowhere I can send my customers to buy something else
while they wait for their prescription to be filled." Chris Starrs, Independent Pharmacies Use
Different Techniques To Compete, ATHENS ONLINE ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Ga.) (Sept. 21,
2008), http://onlineathens.com/stories/092108/bus_335045938.shtml (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Everybody Wants a Piece of the 'Drug Store' Market, CHAIN DRUG REV., OCT.
27, 2008, at 40 ("Independent drug stores . . . typically are much smaller than a chain outlet and
have far fewer front-end products to draw traffic."); Michael Schroeder, The War on Drugs:
Pharmacies on Front Lines as Supermarkets Fight To Draw Customers, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne,
Ind.), Aug. 24, 2008, at I H ("Superstore and supermarket officials say being a one-stop destination
for everything from medications to banking (offered through in-store tenants) is appealing to
consumers who want to spend less on gas. By the way, gas is also sold by many of these stores.").
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PBMs and/or chain pharmacies do exercise monopsony market power, it is not
evident that this market power reduces the level of output and/or translates into
higher prices in the market downstream. There are several reasons why this
might be the case. First, although there may be numerous sellers and one buyer in
a given market, if the supply curve of pharmacists is elastic (i.e., flat) the quantity
demanded will no longer dictate reimbursement rates.163 The same quantity of
pharmaceuticals is demanded regardless of the reimbursement rate. Since
controlling quantity will no longer influence the reimbursement rate when the
supply curve is elastic, the single buyer cannot exercise monopsony power.
Second, the supply curve in the pharmaceutical industry may not mimic the
conventional economic model. Typically, the "supply curve identifies the amount
of services [or goods] that will be supplied at every price when suppliers can
make mar inal adjustments in the quantity supplied in response to price
changes." 1 64 In some industries, however, this is not the case and suppliers face a
decision that is all or nothing, in which the must choose between supplying a
given quantity of goods or no goods at all. If the seller is forced onto the all-
or-nothing supply curve, the monopsonist will be able to achieve even greater
returns than in the typical monopsony scenario because it can now reduce
average reimbursement rates without simultaneously reducing output.166 Because
short-runl67 output remains the same as it would under competitive conditions,
the resulting short-term effects will be distributional, with the buyer capturing the
168
entire producer surplus. Several scholars have posited that this scenario may
indeed hold true in the health provider context, where the quantity of services
provided may not be left entirely to the health care provider's discretion.169
163 See Blair & Boylston Herndon, supra note 11, at 1001-02 for a discussion of this
phenomenon in the context of physician cartels.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1002-03.
166 Id. at 1003. The all-or-nothing supply curve "traces out the average cost curve since the
supply decision ultimately becomes a choice between operating at the indicated quantity or shutting
down." Id. at 1002 n.42. This is because "a supplier will choose to operate as long as it is able to
cover its average costs." Id.
167 While output is not reduced in the short run, this may not be the case in the long run, as
sellers may leave the industry for another in which price is not below average cost. See Roger D.
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 319 (1991).
This would not be the case if the seller could "peg[] a price that [would] permit[] just the right
number of sellers to comfortably stay in business." Id. However, "[t]his argument rests on
unrealistic assumptions about the availability of information and the rationality of business
conduct." Id.
168 Blair & Boylston Herndon, supra note 11, at 1003.
169 Cf id. at 1002-03 ("There may be instances in which a health plan is able to push
physicians onto their all-or-none supply curve. Physicians may face an all-or-none decision when
the purchaser of their services is a dominant health plan that is concerned about coverage as well as
price and, therefore, desires to maintain the same quantity of physician services while imposing a
lower reimbursement rate. Because the health plan negotiates services for a collection of patients, a
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Ironically, in seeking an antitrust exemption, independents have in fact argued
that they face all-or-nothing decisions in the face of monopsonist PBMs.170
Finally, often despite being able to extract below-competitive prices in the
"upstream" market, a monopsonist (or a member of a buyers' cartel that has
monopsony ower) is not always the only seller in the resale market
downstream. In this world, a monopsonist does not impact directly the prices
that individual members of the cartel will charge consumers for the outputs. 172
This is because "[d]ownstream prices are a function of the market or markets in
which such sales are made."I 3 If the downstream market is competitive, a
monopsonist still will be forced to sell to consumers at a competitive level of
result in deselection by the health plan, thereby losing access to all of its subscribers. Physicians
will continue to participate in the health plan, even if they object to these terms, when they are
financially dependent on the dominant insurer. When confronted with lower reimbursement rates,
the terms of the contract with the health plan, in addition to ethical and reputational considerations,
constrain the physician's ability to restrict the services provided to a particular patient. For
example, the physician's contract with a health plan often specifies certain minimum service
requirements that the physician must meet."); see also Blair & Harrison, supra note 167, at 319.
170 In re Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-cv-05674, 2006 WL
5502869 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2006) ("Defendant PBMs present Plaintiffs with take-it-or-leave it
contracts that set the prices for reimbursement and impose other anticompetitive terms."); see also
Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit
Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 46 (2007) ("The retail pharmacies are generally
offered a 'take it or leave it' deal to be included in the network, with only the largest pharmacy
chains having any ability to negotiate with the PBMs."). Physicians have made the same argument
in their dealing with insurers as well. See, for example, Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st
Cir. 1984), in which physicians argued that Blue Shield offered insurance contracts on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.
171 As one scholar notes, this arrangement still will be economically attractive to a
monopsonist: "When buyers can make an 'all or nothing' offer to a producer that has increasing
marginal cost, the buyer can offer to buy a large volume at a price equal to the average cost of
production. It will be rational for the producer to accept this offer and deliver the same quantity that
it would have delivered at a market price equal to the marginal cost of its last unit. This means the
buyer can induce a level of production comparable to the competitive level, but at the same time
transfer all [ofj the infra-marginal gain (Riccardian Rents) to themselves." Carstensen, supra note
43, at 21.
172 Where the monopsonist (or a member of a buyers' cartel) does not sell in a competitive
downstream market, but rather is the only seller in the resale market, consumers are likely to face
supercompetitive prices. This is because
[t]he monopsony buyer, unlike the competitive buyer, can reduce the purchase
price by scaling back its purchases. Because the monopsonist ordinarily
reduces its buying power by purchasing less, it sells less downstream. This
reduction in its own output will, if it has market power on the selling side,
mean higher prices for customers. Thus, lower buying prices upstream may
translate into higher seller prices downstream.
PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION § 574 (1978).
173 Carstensen, supra note 43, at 10.
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174
output at a competitive price. Therefore, unless PBMs act both as
monopsonists in the upstream market and monopolists in the downstream market,
economists have posited that the consumer-harm argument loses steam. 175 While
the monopsonist still will have extracted a surplus from the seller who sold its
inputs at a below-competitive price, in the short run, "there is no efficiency harm
because there is the same production and price is not increased."l 76 There is at
least some reason to believe that this scenario might accurately reflect reality in
the case of PBMs. Even assuming that PBMs exert monopsony power vis-a-vis
pharmacists, PBMs still may not exert sufficient monopoly power in the
downstream market to "resell" the pharmaceuticals to plan sponsors and
consumers at above-market rates. 177
Given the failure of independents to account for such contingencies in their
analysis, it cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion that PBMs' bargaining
power necessarily translates into the type of harm to consumers that the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent or the magnitude of harm that independents assert.
This analysis is not to say that such aggregations of buying power are innocuous
or that they should be permitted to exist absent intervention. It also is not to
assert the necessary existence of such conditions that may mitigate the harmful
effects on consumer welfare. It is to say, however, that independents' economic
analysis is underdeveloped and under-theorized. Sophisticated economic models
are needed to predict an intermediate buyer's abilit to effect a change in the
welfare of primary-market consumers downstream. 8 Still, even if one rejects
entirely the above analysis put forth by economists, independents' lobbying
efforts rest on an additional premise. Assuming, arguendo, the existence of an
inefficient PBM monopsony, the next Subsection examines and ultimately rejects
independents' presumption that the legalization of independent pharmacy cartels
would be the appropriate mechanism to return the market to equilibrium.
174 This scenario will hold true where either: (1) "buyers can compel the producers to deliver
approximately the same output at the lower price" or (2) "buyers compete in a resale market with
many other producers such that the resale is set competitively and the cartel has no incentive or
capacity to raise the prices of its output." Id. at 21.
175 This outcome will be different if after purchasing discrete units of goods from sellers,
buyers resell those goods in a market in which they are the only sellers. See id. at 20. In this world,
when buyers reduce the price that they pay for their inputs, output of that commodity in the resale
market (i.e., sales to individual consumers) declines. Id. Here, a buyers' cartel harms consumers by
reducing production and increasing prices charged to consumers. Id. at 20-2 1.
176 Id. at 21. "[T]he contemporary economic welfare model is not concerned" with
"transfer[s]of surplus from seller to buyer" without any accompanying impact on consumers. See
id. at 21 & n.83.
177 See Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 14 (statement of Richard A.
Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission) (noting that "[t]he FTC found
in its most recent antitrust investigation of the PBM industry, that competition among PBMs for
contracts with plan sponsors is 'vigorous').
178 Frances H. Miller, Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances: Monopsony Threat or
Procompetitive Rxfor Health Sector Ills?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1546, 1551 (1994).
232
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c. The Promise ofBilateral Monopoly in Returning the Market to
Equilibrium
Finally, even when one accepts that the PBM market is anticompetitive, in
that PBMs constitute a monopsony and this power translates into a reduction in
consumer welfare, independents' argument still rests on the critical assumption
that the cartelization of pharmacists - and thus the creation of a bilateral
monopoly - is the only (or, alternatively, best) way to counteract these
anticompetitive forces. Although superficially attractive, the argument that
Congress should legalize cartels of pharmacists in order to facilitate the
formation of a bilateral monopoly is subject to several fallacies.
First, while the economic effects can be predicted to some extent in the case
of a perfect bilateral monopoly, where there is one seller and buyer, the analysis
becomes significantly less clear when the model accounts for multiple buyers and
sellers with market power, which would be the case in the pharmaceutical supply
chain. As noted by two scholars:
In the extreme case of bilateral monopoly, we know what the
welfare consequences are. In cases involving substantial
concentration (i.e. oligopoly or oligopsony), it is not clear that
the formation of countervailing power is desirable. This
ambiguity follows from the lack of a unified theory of oligopoly.
Since we cannot be sure a priori what the welfare effects of
oligopoly are, it is not possible to say what the consequences of
the countervailing oligopsony power will be.179
Therefore, as long as the given industry's "very specific behavioral
characteristics" remain unidentifiable or unstable, economists are unable to
predict accurately the precise effects of a sanctioned oligopsony.iso Such
uncertainty makes this policy choice risky.
Second, others have expressed concern that sanctioning the formation of
countervailing market power in an intermediate market creates great risk that this
power will spill over into the downstream output market, ultimately hurting
consumers. This conclusion is intuitive: allowing pharmacists to collude on
the reimbursement rates received from PBMs for their sale of pharmaceuticals
will translate into collusion with respect to other consumer goods sold in
pharmacies. As noted by one scholar: "[T]here may be something approaching
economies of scale in collusive activities. Thus, the costs of gathering together
and deciding on a common plan could be spread over plans associated with both
179 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 131, at 140-41.
180 Id. at 141.
181 Id. at 138-39. Blair and Harrison discuss this risk in general terms rather than apply their
insights to one particular market. See id.
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buying and selling."l82 In other words, once independents already have expended
resources to collude with respect to the reimbursement rates obtained from a
given PBM, the costs of colluding with respect to other areas of their businesses
declines. Furthermore, once pharmacists begin collaborating in one market, it
will be more difficult to detect where they have overstepped their bounds and
reached a tacit agreement elsewhere.ts3 As the risk of detection and cost per
agreement declines, the likelihood of such an agreement increases.184
Furthermore, there is concern that even in the case of a perfect bilateral
monopoly, where there is a single buyer and seller, the monopolist and
monopsonist will not have exactly equivalent market power. In order "for
bilateral monopoly to benefit society, bargaining strengths of buyers and sellers
must be approximately equal. If either side has a disproportionate share of the
bargainin power, it will be able to tilt the balance in its favor to the detriment of
society." Accordingly, although "the bilateral monopoly is, at least
theoretically, closer to the competitive equilibrium than the pure monopoly
equilibrium," "[e]ven in the perfect bilateral monopoly situation, where there is
only one buyer and one seller, the equilibrium price will likely be above the
perfectly competitive price."l 86
Finally, given that agreements between insurers and health care providers
are not immune from antitrust scrutiny, pharmacies are able to fight any
suspected anticompetitive activity through litigation. This reduces the need to
fight collusion through collective bargaining, which, as explained above,
theoretically may bring the market closer to equilibrium, but is unlikely to
produce the competitive prices characteristic of a market plagued neither by
monopoly nor monopsony.187 Since Group Life, pharmacists certainly have taken
advantage of their right to bring private claims under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Independent and community pharmacies might charge that, unlike chain
pharmacies, they do not have sufficient financial resources to engage in
expensive litigation, but past experience proves otherwise.189 For example, in
182 Id. at 139.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS AND POLICY 62 (5th ed. 2010).
186 Alexander, supra note 108, at 1620.
187 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 49, at 19 ("[A]ny person (including federal
and state governments) who is injured or threatened by a violation of federal antitrust law may
bring a civil suit in federal court to enjoin conduct violating the antitrust laws, and any such person
who is injured in his or her business or property by such a violation may commence a federal civil
action to recover three times the party's actual damages.").
188 See, e.g., Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 239 F. Supp. 2d
180, 182, 183-84 (D.R.I. 2003).
189 Another version of this argument is that exercising countervailing market power is "a less
restrictive method" of bringing the market back into competitive balance than "the more
problematic alternatives of bringing a costly and unpromising antitrust suit." Havighurst, supra
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North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., independent pharmacists
brought a class action against a pharmaceutical manufacturer and three PBMs
alleging that the defendants agreed both amongst themselves and with other
PBMs to fix prices in the sale of pharmaceuticals to the class of independents.190
Similarly, in Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, several independent pharmacies
and two not-for-profit organizations, each composed of thousands of independent
community-pharmacy owners, brought suit against a PBM, alleging that it had
engaged with competitors in a horizontal agreement with the effect of restraining
trade in the drug dispensing industry.191
It is for these reasons that economists have advised against combating a
perceived monopsony through creation of a countervailing market power. As
Peter Rankin, Principal at CRA International, an economics and management
consulting firm, testified before Congress, "The regulatory agencies and most
economists have regularly dismissed the concept of combating perceived
competitive imbalances in market power by creating 'countervailing' market
power. The appropriate response, instead, is to determine if there is a legitimate
competitive imbalance and address the economic factors creating that
imbalance."192 Thus, because it is not clear that the PBM market is
anticompetitive, and, even if it were, litigation directly challenging PBM
monopsony would serve as a more appropriate mechanism for independents and
law enforcers to combat anticompetitive activity and fully remedy market
failures, an antitrust exemption for independent pharmacies is neither warranted
nor advised.
4. Empirical Evidence
Empirical data also supports the conclusion that an antitrust exemption will
not result in lower health care costs. According to research, if it had been passed,
the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 2000 would have "rais[ed] annual
medical costs by as much as $29-$141 billion over a five-year period as a result
of higher physician fees, changes in practice patterns, and the ripple effect on
190 345 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2004). Acknowledging that under Socony-
Vacuum, a horizontal conspiracy to fix prices at below market-rate levels is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, the district judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ruled that the
plaintiffs' amended complaint "afford[ed] no sound basis for ruling out the possibility that the
Plaintiffs w[ould] be able to establish facts which establish a right of recovery for violation of the
Sherman Act." Id. at 1296.
191 No. Civ. A. 03-4731, 2004 WL 724490, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2004). Again, the district
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at *6.
192 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 971 Before the H. Comm.
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government program costs."193 More specifically, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that if passed, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of
1999 would have (1) elevated private health insurance premiums; 194 (2)
decreased federal tax revenues by $145 million in 2001 and $3.6 billion between
2001 and 2010 as a result of reductions in taxable income and fringe benefits;195
(3) increased federal direct spending by several billion dollars across a number of
federal programs by 2011;196 and (4) increased various federal agencies'
discretionary spending by $150 million over ten years. 197 Under the CBO's
assumption that one-third of pharmacists would have taken advantage of their
newfound immunity, pharmacists' collective activity alone would have raised
private health insurance expenditures by 0.1%, with the average pharmacist
increasing his or her net margin by fifteen percent.198
The CBO also ran cost estimates for the Community Pharmacy Fairness Act
of 2007, which would have exempted only independent pharmacies (rather than
all health professionals) from antitrust laws for five years.199 First, the CBO
estimated that the bill, if enacted, would have increased payments for
prescription drugs dispensed by independent pharmacies by one percent
commencing in 2010-the year that most affected contracts would have been
193 Thomas J. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in
Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 191 & n.27 (2002) (citing various studies with "different
assumptions about effects on utilization management, percentage of physicians that would take
advantage of the legislation, and spillover effects").
194 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 1304: QUALITY HEALTH-CARE COALITION ACT OF 2000, at 2-
3 (2000). As a corollary to the elevated private-insurance premiums, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) predicted that employers sponsoring health plans would have passed these higher
costs on to employees in the form of decreased wages and fringe benefits. Id. at 3. These reductions
would have in turn affected the federal tax revenues. Id. at 7.
195 Id. at 1, 7. Because the bill, as passed by the House, contained a three-year sunset
provision, the CBO estimated that "the full effects that the antitrust exemption could have on the
health insurance market [were] likely not to be realized." Id. at 2. Despite this, the CBO concluded:
[T]he effects of the legislation would likely persist beyond the third year for
several reasons: contracts negotiated during the first three years might extend
beyond the period; health plans might go through an adjustment period while
re-establishing utilization controls in the post-sunset period; and, since fee
levels for health professionals would have been established at higher levels
than would occur under current law, the market would take some time to re-
adjust once the original antitrust treatment were restored.
Id.
196 Id. at 1, 7.
197 Id. at 1.
198 Id. at 5.
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renegotiated.200 The CBO predicted that as a result of these cost increases, group
health insurance premiums would have risen, and employers would have passed
these increases on to workers in the form of reductions in the scope or generosity
of health insurance benefits, such as higher copayments and deductibles as well
as reductions in taxable income and fringe benefits.201 Because of these
reductions in taxable income, the bill, if enacted, would have depressed federal
tax revenues by $5 million in 2009 and by $120 million from 2008 to 2018.202
Federal direct spending for health benefits also would have increased by $488
million from 2008 to 2013 and by $520 million from 2008 to 2018. The
combined effect of reduced tax revenues and increased direct spending would
have served to reduce government surpluses or to increase government deficits
by $640 million between 2008 and 2018.204 Therefore, neither economic theory
nor empirical evidence can support an antitrust exemption on the basis that it
would reduce or preserve health care costs.
B. Quality of Care
Still, supporters of the exemption claim in the alternative that while an
exemption may increase pharmaceutical prices, a simultaneous boost in the
quality of patient care would offset this escalation and thus be procompetitive.
Indeed, the pharmacy lobby has packaged the exemption proposals as attempts
"[t]o ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care." 205 While not
always expressed in economic terms, this argument too is predicated on claims of
market failure and imperfection. Independents claim that while they provide
superior service as compared to chain and mail-order pharmacies - service that
drastically increases quality of health care - market imperfections prevent this
enhanced quality from being reflected in the allocation of goods and services in
the marketplace as it would in a perfectly competitive market.
This Section argues, however, not only that these claims of quality
deficiency are overblown, but also that collective bargaining by independents is
an improper mechanism through which to improve health care quality.
Subsection III.B.1 explains the relationship between competition and quality,
demonstrating that restraining market competition will lead to inefficient
200 Id. at 3. In formulating this approximation, the CBO accounted for the fact that health
providers would want to both establish an attractive list of in-network pharmacies and to meet their
adequacy-of-network requirements. Id. at 3-4.
201 Id. at 4.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1.
204 Id.
205 Community Pharmacy Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1839, 112th Cong. (2011); Quality
Health Care Coalition Act of 2011, H.R. 1409, 112th Cong. (2011).
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outcomes.206 Subsection III.B.2 then considers and rejects independents'
contention that collective bargaining must be permitted to correct these market
failures and improve quality of care.
1. Market Efficiency and Quality of Care
In order to "play[] to consumers' fears, as well as those of policy makers and
politicians," 207 the medical lobby has packaged its exemption platform on the
notion that the closing of small pharmacies hurts not only their owners, but also
patient welfare. In part, these claims are built on those of monopsony rejected
above. According to independents, because their pharmacists build strong
relationships with their atients, they provide care superior to that of chain and
mail-order pharmacies. As a result, when PBMs force independents out of
business, patient health care declines. Moreover, independents claim that even if
they are not forced out of business, PBMs have cut independents' reimbursement
levels so drastically that independents are forced to "increase volume, reduce the
level of service, increase waiting times, and reduce staff," all of which reduce
patient satisfaction, compromise the pharmacist-patient relationship, and damage
the level of care.209 While chain and supermarket pharmacies too have reported
frustration with PBMs, independents allege that larger entities often have
circumvented these pressures through exercising superior bargaining power or by
206 HAAS-WILSON, supra note 49, at 38; Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust,
Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 611 (2002). In finding restraints on
trade anticompetitive (absent procompetitive justifications in rule-of-reason cases), the courts
largely stick to this economic model. Therefore, courts presume that "[c]ompetition in the health
care markets [will] . . . lower health care prices, reduce health care costs, and improve health care
quality." Id. at 612; see also id. at 612, 636 (concluding, after conducting "a comprehensive
empirical review of judicial review of judicial opinions in medical antitrust litigation between 1985
and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns," that
"[o]f the opinions that expressed general beliefs about the role of competition, the vast majority
adhered to traditional economic assumptions"); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-62 (1986) (taking as given traditional economic assumptions when
conducting its rule-of-reason analysis); Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, No. 95 CIV. 6631 (DLC),
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *21-*22 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996) (expressing faith in the
market's ability to strike appropriate market-price tradeoffs); Koefoot v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons,
652 F. Supp. 882, 904 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[T]he 'best' product or service will be selected by
consumers where when their choice is made in an open market free of restraints.").
207 CARLE F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MONOPOLY TO MARKET
COMPETITION 177 (2008) (discussing, in particular, the American Medical Association's strategy of
introducing bills, such as the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act, with a "quality" focus).
208 Independents believe that this pharmacist-patient relationship is responsible for the fact
that independents' patients are "more likely to take their medicines on-time, more likely to take
them properly, more likely to refill meds before they run out and more likely to avoid harmful drug
interactions [than those of mail-order or chain pharmacies]." Community Pharmacies Hearing,
supra note 73, at 80 (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Action Fund).
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operating their own PBMs. 210
Given the dismissal of claims that PBMs constitute a monopsony in Section
III.A, these contentions that the market power of PBMs diminishes quality
should be dismissed easily as well. This is because microeconomic theory
dictates that "absent identifiable market failures," competition will yield
consumers' desired "range of price-quality combinations." 211 In other words, it is
not within the province of an economist's role to determine whether a high-
priced but high-quality good is preferable to one that is low priced and of low
quality. Rather, the goal is more limited: to preserve competitive conditions in
which consumers can "effectively vote with their wallets and their feet, deciding
which products to buy and from which sellers." 212 When everything functions as
it should, society's resources should be "naturally directed into the production of
those products that consumers value most highly." 213
Applying this concept to the pharmaceutical company, the market if
competitive should reflect the proper quality/cost tradeoffs through consumers'
purchase of insurance. Therefore, even assuming that independents provide a
greater level of service, consumers indicate their willingness to forgo the superior
service for the associated cost savings by frequenting mail-order and chain
pharmacies and purchasing insurance plans that emphasize cost savings over a
broad range of pharmacy choices. All else being equal, every consumer
presumably would prefer the customized service provided by independents and
the superior health outcomes that independents assert they produce. But, at some
point in the tradeoff, the conflicting desire for low-cost health care and greater
output of health care goods and services prevails. 214
Although quality-of-care claims premised on the monopsony power of
210 See PBMs Emerge as a Dominant Force in Retail Pharmacy, CHAIN DRUG REv., Aug. 26,
1996, at RX 13; David Pinto, Chains Need to Step Up Involvement in PBM Business, CHAIN DRUG
REV., Apr. 27, 1998, at 1; Harry Wessel, Tiny Pharmacies Feeling Squeeze, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 11, 2007, at Cl; Joanne Wojcik, Drug Chains Trying Another Dose of PBM Business To
Compete, Bus. INS., May 2, 2005, at 1.
211 Hammer & Sage, supra note 206, at 611. In economic terms, allocative efficiency is
"achieved when each good is produced up to the point where the value consumers place on the last
unit produced is equal to the cost of producing the last unit." HAAS-WILSoN, supra note 49, at 38.
212 HAAS-WILSON, supra note 49, at 39.
213 Id.
214 As Professor George Priest has noted:
In many respects, no two consumers are alike and each consumer would prefer
products and services most closely designed to meet his or her preferences.
Over some range, however, the cost reductions from taking advantage of scale
economies prevail over the magnitude of differences in consumer values and
preferences for individually designed products. Large business emerges where
the cost savings from scale economies prevail.
George L. Priest, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the Huffman Conjecture, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 7 (2003).
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PBMs rest on shaky ground, independents also point to a variety of other PBM
practices that they perceive to diminish invidiously health care quality, and which
they hope to correct through collective bargaining. In doing so, independents
contest an "assumption of conventional antitrust economics: that markets with
active competition over price and output will also compete effectively over
,215quality." First, independents point to a heavily entrenched practice of PBM
self-dealing and vertical consolidation.216 These claims are heavily targeted
towards PBMs' operation of their own mail-order facilities, which "give[s] them
an additional opportunity to profit from transactions by health plan
participants."217 One of independents' most frequent contentions is that PBMs
disturbingly have forced or heavily incentivized a large number of vulnerable
patients (particularly the elderly in rural areas) to fill their prescriptions through
PBM-owned mail-order programs.218 Accusing mail orders of being "shady
operators that threaten neighborhood pharmacists," pharmacists charge that mail-
order restrictions not only prevent patients from being able to fill prescriptions
immediately, but also inhibit the personal pharmacist-patient relationship that
many patients want and that is necessary to effective care.219 Mike James, the
215 Sage & Hammer, supra note 53, at 257.
216 Garrett & Garis, supra note 170, at 61, 66-68.
217 Id. at 66.
218 Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 17 (testimony of Mike James, Vice
President, Association of Community Pharmacies Congressional Network & Pharmacist/Owner,
Person St. Pharmacy, Raleigh, N.C.); Starrs, supra note 162 (quoting a pharmacy owner as saying
"I think our biggest competition is mail-order and online prescriptions, and some PBMs have their
own pharmacies . ... And a lot of managed-care plans will require that clients buy from PBMs or
make it so difficult for them that they don't have many other choices"). Though independents claim
their main issue with mail-order pharmacies is the disturbing health consequences for their patients,
their rhetoric in the debate make clear that their economic interests are front and center. For
example, independents claim that when PBMs do not officially require patients to use their mail-
order facilities, they put retail pharmacies at a distinct disadvantage by charging below-competitive
prices for mail-order prescriptions and offering gimmicks such as allowing patients the opportunity
to obtain a three-month supply of medication at a time through mail order, while only allowing
retail pharmacies to dispense a one month supply. Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73,
at 15 (testimony of Mike James, Vice President, Association of Community Pharmacies
Congressional Network & Pharmacist/Owner, Person St. Pharmacy, Raleigh, N.C.). Independents
believe that these practices are unethical, as PBMs' mail-order divisions directly compete against
the independent pharmacies with whom they contract. Id. at 15, 17. Absent sufficient evidence of
market failure, however, questions are raised as to whether this attitude is paternalistic and
detrimental to consumers' ability to choose the quality/price mix they find most appealing. See,
e.g., M. Joseph Sirgy & Dong-Jin Lee, Ethical Foundations of Well-Being Marketing, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 49, 55 (Mary W. Vilcox & Thomas 0. Mohan eds.
2007); cf Michael D. Bromberg, Flexibility in Antitrust Enforcement, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 150, 150
(1993) (discussing the need for "consumers [to] vote with their pocketbooks based on their own
values and perceptions of quality, access, and cost options" with regard to available health care
plans).
219 Lisa Wangsness, A Big Push on Mail-Order Drugs Savings, Efficiency Hailed, Disputed,
BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2009, at Al; see also Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at
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Vice President of the Association of Community Pharmacies Congressional
Network and an independent himself, testified before Congress that this
relationship is critically important when "[t]he pharmacist is the only health care
professional who knows all of the patient's medications, their interactions, and
whether there are low cost generics available to address the patient's needs." 220
Finally, independents point to the lack of transparency and asymmetric
information in PBM practices, which exacerbates or creates agency problems.
According to independents, without proper and full information, consumers,
employers, and pharmacists are unable to make the decisions necessary for the
market to run properly. It is true that even absent monopsony, 221 competition
only works if:
(1) consumers know about or can learn about the prices and
qualities of products offered by various sellers; (2) consumers
have the incentive to search for the sellers offering the best
deals; (3) sellers know about or can learn about their consumers;
[and] (4) sellers can enter profitable markets and exit
unprofitable ones.222
Independents correctly may argue that the market is not accurately pricing the
higher level of quality they offer if any one of these four conditions does not hold
true.
In part, these allegations are those of intentional deceit,223 which
Congressional Network & Pharmacist/Owner, Person St. Pharmacy, Raleigh, N.C.) ("The take-over
by PBMs is also resulting in movement . . . to mail-order prescription programs. This has provided
a perverse outcome for patients, who have no say in how their pharmacy benefits will be delivered,
and are afraid to complain in fear of losing their benefit. These patients are denied their traditional
right to seek personal and confidential professional assistance from local, hometown pharmacy
professionals.").
220 Community Pharmacies Hearing, supra note 73, at 17 (testimony of Mike James, Vice
President, Association of Community Pharmacies Congressional Network & Pharmacist/Owner,
Person St. Pharmacy, Raleigh, N.C.).
221 Not only does information failure inhibit the running of an efficient market, but it also can
entrench monopsony itself. Garrett & Garis, supra note 170, at 63 ("Arguably, the market power
that PBMs wield stems both from market share and also from the paucity of information available
to those who deal with the PBMs.").
222 HAAS-WILSON, supra note 49, at 39; see also Sage & Hammer, Competing on Quality of
Care: The Need To Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1069, 1089 (1999) ("[A]ntitrust laws assume that competitive mixes are allocatively
efficient. This assumption implies that markets will determine the appropriate prices for medical
services, the appropriate tradeoffs between price and quality, and the appropriate tradeoffs among
different quality attributes. However, failures endemic in health care markets make it necessary to
seriously question this assumption.").
223 Independents complement their claims of intentional deceit with that of inherent and
inevitable market failure in health care markets. For example, David Balto, a staunch advocate of
an exemption, explained in his testimony before the Ohio Senate Insurance, Commerce, and Labor
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independents posit is widespread and systematic. According to independents,
employers and MCOs are being tricked by informational asymmetries in their
dealings with PBMs. The primary contention is that "PBMs, which are ostensibly
hired by health plans as the agents for those plans to negotiate with
manufacturers and retail pharmacies, hide from their own clients what they pay
for prescriptions and often fail to disclose appropriate information regarding
rebates."2  Similarly, another advocate has argued that "the self insured
employer never sees on their monthly itemized statement how much was actually
paid to the provider but only what they were charged for the product or service
by the PBM." 225  Furthermore, "[p]articipating network pharmacies are
contractually prohibited from directly contacting the clients (the employers) of
the PBM's [sic] and disclosing the compensation that they receive directly from
the PBM[,] thereby eliminating a vital component of the free market system
necessary to maintain competitive forces in the marketplace." 226 Other
allegations include PBMs "[u]sing aggressive marketing tactics to steer patients
Committee:
[T]here is a tremendous need for reform in the PBM market. The fundamental
elements for a competitive market are transparency, choice, and a lack of
conflicts of interest. This is especially true when dealing with health care
intermediaries such as PBMs and health insurers where information may be
difficult to access, there are agency relationships, and securing adequate
information may be difficult to access . . . . Transparency is necessary for
consumers to evaluate products carefully, to make informed choices, and to
secure the full range of services they desire.
Hearing on S.B. 154 Before the S. Comm. on Ins., Labor, & Commerce, 2010 Leg., 128th Gen.
Assemb. (Ohio 2010) [hereinafter Ohio Hearing] (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center
for American Progress Action Fund), available at http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/
2010/02/pdflbalto testimony-pbms.pdf.
224 Garrett & Garis, supra note 170, at 61.
225 Dan Benamoz, Pharmacists Must Lead the Way to Fixing America's Health Care Crisis 4
(Jan. 2008) (unpublished white paper), available at http://www.pharmacyowners.com/Portals/
37772/docs/White-Paper-Demise-of-Mail-Order.pdf.
226 Id.; see also David Balto, Bending the Cost Curve: Regulating Healthcare Middlemen,
HILL (Sept. 4, 2009 1:29 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/5737 I-bending-
the-cost-curve-regulatinghealthcare-middlemen ("A lack of transparency is one of the key problems
in the pharmacy benefit management industry. For example, PBMs often charge the health plans
they serve significantly more for the drugs than they pay the pharmacies that distribute the drugs to
patients. PBMs also may switch patients to a drug other than the one their doctor prescribed[,]
sometimes a drug more expensive for the health plan and patient[,] to take advantage of rebates the
PBM receives from drug manufacturers, which are often hidden from the PBM's customers."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Robert 1. Garis et al., Examining the Value of Pharmacy
Benefit Management Companies, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS 81, 85 (2004) ("What seems
clear from this navigation of the PBM maze is that prescription benefit plan sponsors (either private
employers or government entities) should insist on full disclosure of cash flows to and through the
PBM that is administering their drug benefit. Without this level of scrutiny, the plan sponsor cannot
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to [their own] pharmacies"; "[t]aking advantage of access to independent
pharmacies' claims data in order to target their customers and steer them to [their
own] pharmacies";227 participating in crooked pricing and deceptive advertising
schemes; and forcing "gag clauses" on pharmacists, prohibiting them from
informing patients about non-formulary-listed medications.228 These claims boil
down to the fact that "restrictions on pricing transparency 'increase the difficulty
of discovering the lowest cost seller,"' who also offers the highest degree of
quality. 229
Independents also allege that the consumers themselves are being deceived.
As one advocate writes, "America is . . . being told that money grubbing
community pharmacies are overcharging them. Little does the typical American
know that this argument is a classical ruse, a method to distract them so they
don't feel the boney fingers of shadowy figures inside their pockets seizing their
wallets." 230 According to independents' allegations, PBMs' deceitful practices
compound already-existing agency problems, as consumers already "find it
difficult to evaluate the cost and quality of health services" given "the technical
nature of medical information and the complexity of diagnoses and treatment
alternatives."231 The message of independents is clear: if consumers, MCOs, and
employers cannot adequately evaluate quality and cost, the market falls victim to
inefficient resource allocation. Although intuitively plausible, one should not
take independents' arguments pertaining to these market failures for granted, but
rather, should examine critically the set of assumptions about the market on
which these arguments are based.
227 Ohio Hearing, supra note 223. Indeed, commentators have noted that "[i]n health care, a
variety of circumstances undermine the neoclassical assumption that buyers and sellers possess
adequate information to assess the quality and costs of the services provided." Thomas L. Greaney,
The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 818
(2011).
228 Mila Ann Aroskar, Ethical Aspects of Pharmacy Practice in Managed Care, in MANAGED
CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 507, 509; see also Community Pharmacies Hearing,
supra note 73, at 87 (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Action Fund) (discussing provisions that "prevent[] pharmacies from informing consumers of less
expensive and more appropriate prescriptions"); Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46,
at 56-57 (statement of Mark Riley, Nat'l Treasurer, National Community Pharmacists Association)
(explaining that "[m]ail-order is steeped in deceptive pricing schemes that are intended to dupe
employers into believing that they are saving money").
229 Garrett & Garis, supra note 170, at 63 n.161 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 377-78 (1977)).
230 Benamoz, supra note 225, at 1.
231 Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust Health
Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REv. 605, 633-34 (1989) ("[T]he considerable uncertainty that
attends medical treatment makes judgment on causation (and hence costs and benefits of treatment)
difficult. In addition, information is asymmetrically distributed among providers, patients, and
payers. This characteristic may permit physicians to induce demand for their services; at a
minimum it makes information costly for buyers to acquire.").
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2. Questioning Independents'Assumptions: Quality of Care
Independents' argument relating to quality enhancement relies primarily on
two assumptions: (1) independents provide superior health care quality as
compared to chain and mail-order pharmacies, but are unable to compete with
them under current market conditions; and (2) collective bargaining would be
able to compensate for these distortions by delivering an optimal level of care to
consumers, as under perfect competition. This Subsection examines each of these
assumptions in turn.
a. Superior Health Care Quality
The first assumption is that while independents provide superior health care
services, they are unable to compete with mail-order and chain pharmacies due to
the PBMs' lack of transparency and deceptive trade practices. There is little
evidence, however, supporting the assertion that independent and community
pharmacies provide superior health care as compared to chain or even mail-order
pharmacies. While a retail pharmacist can provide in-person medication
counseling, which a mail-order pharmacist cannot, it is not obvious why a
pharmacist at an independent pharmacy would provide superior counseling to
one at a chain or supermarket pharmacy. Simply because an independent
pharmacist may know more patients' names or faces does not result necessarily
in a superior level of treatment quality.
Moreover, from a safety standpoint, mail-order services offer vastly lower
error rates. Because mail-order pharmacies benefit from economies of scale, they
can afford immensely superior processing and dispensing equipment, with built-
in infrared scanners that check and re-check each prescription bottle for
accuracy.232 Highly automated prescription dispensing systems can achieve
accuracy rates twenty-three times higher than those reported in a benchmark
study of retail community pharmacies. 233 Furthermore, because mail-order
pharmacies are so large - some physically as big as six football fields - they
can hire pharmacists who only handle medications for a given disease, such as
cancer or diabetes.234 These pharmacists review each patient's file, highlight any
potential drug interactions, and verify that no cheaper alternative exists.235
Finally, mail-order pharmacists are available to answer patients' questions
twenty-four hours per day.236 Given the fact that independents have not been able
to offset the objective data indicating that chain or mail-order pharmacies
232 Wangsness, supra note 219, at Al.
233 J. Russell Teagarden et al., Dispensing Error Rate in a Highly Automated Mail-Service
Pharmacy Practice, 25 J. PHARMACOLOGY & DRUG THERAPY 1629, 1633 (2005).
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actually may provide higher quality care with any empirical support to the
contrary, it would be imprudent to conclude that the provision of preferential
treatment to independents in their negotiations with PBMs would improve health
care quality.
Finally, to the extent that independents actually do provide a higher quality
of care, it is unclear that collective bargaining is the answer. First, higher
reimbursement rates effected through collective bargaining may have unintended
consequences when one takes at face value independents' assertion that health
care quality is the ultimate goal. First, as the price increases to use independents
to fulfill the needs of MCOs' customers, the law of demand dictates that PBMs
will seek to substitute the services of independents where possible. 237 No doubt
PBMs will be constrained to some extent in their endeavors given requirements
that insurance plans include a certain number of pharmacies per any given area.
That said, to the extent that PBMs currently are exceeding such requirements,
they logically will seek to reduce the number of PBMs in their networks in favor
of chain pharmacies who may now have relatively less economic clout. To the
extent that such substitution is impossible, PBMs may seek to increase the
incentives for patients to use alternative mechanisms of fulfilling their
prescriptions, such as mail-order pharmacies, which independents say so
perniciously impact health care quality.23 8
Moreover, not only does economic theory dictate that competition keeps
prices in check, it also predicts that competition stimulates innovation, leading to
higher quality - an argument that independents have not countered successfully
in their lobbying efforts. 239 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Freeman v. San Diego
Association of Realtors, the failure of some competitors is inherent in the nature
of competition: "Inefficiency is precisely what the market aims to weed out. The
Sherman Act, to ut it bluntly, contemplates some roadkill on the turnpike to
Efficiencyville." Or in the words of Judge Posner, "[b]usiness failures are an
237 Cf RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICs: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 492-94 (7th ed. 2000) (explaining how unions incentivize firms to substitute
capital for labor, train nonunion workers, or subcontract services currently provided by union
employees).
238 It still may be worth it financially for independents to enter into such arrangements (i.e.,
the increased reimbursement may compensate sufficiently for any decrease in business).
239 This is not to say that there are not arguments that independents can make, though they
almost certainly would be controversial and thus in need of further analysis. For example, in the
labor context, one theory in favor of the beneficial societal impact of unions is "that employers are
not as knowledgeable about how to maximize profits as standard economic theory assumes.
Because management finds it costly to search for better (or less costly) ways to produce, so the
argument goes, we cannot be sure that it will always use labor in the most productive way
possible.... When unions organize and raise the wages of their members, firms may be 'shocked'
into the search for better ways to produce." EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 237, at 516.
240 322 F.3d 1133, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d
302, 315 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[Tlhe Sherman Act does not protect competitors from being destroyed
245
48
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/4
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
indispensable means of imparting incentives for efficient business behavior, by
placing the costs of mistakes on the firms that make them." 241
Evidence shows that on this road to "Efficiencyville," competition has
forced pharmacists to be more efficient. Those pharmacies that have done the
best, thriving in recent years, have carved out niches for themselves by appealin
to customers drawn to independents who provide more personalized service;
who invest in new technologies that have improved patient care while reducing
operating costs;243 and who specialize in unique products and services, such as
home delivery, 244 curb service, 245 hard-to-find medical items (e.g., shoes for
diabetics) 246 the compounding of medications from scratch, 24 nutrition
services, and patient charge accounts.249 These pharmacies are fulfilling one
of the primary roles of small businesses in the U.S. economy: not just to
stimulate economic growth but rather "to meet the demand of limited sets of
through competition; on the contrary, such destruction can signal healthy functioning of the
enterprise system.").
241 POSNER, supra note 102, at 28.
242 See Tamara Best, Independent Pharmacies Adapt to New Competitors, Economic
Challenges, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), Feb. 28, 2010, at Cl; Frederick, supra note
152, at 17; Dana M. Nichols, Service First for Mom-and-Pop Shop Owners: Calaveras Pharmacy
Gives Personal Attention, RECORDNET.COM (Stockton, C.A.) (July 5, 2009),
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090705/ABIZ/307059998/-
1/ANEWS13; Hilary Potkewitz, Drugstores Surviving Onslaught of Chains by Banding Together,
27 L.A. Bus. J. 2 (2005); Resilient Community Pharmacies Rely on Patient Services To Weather
Economic Downturn, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 19 2009 [hereinafter Resilient]; Maria Sonnenberg,
Independent Stores Thrive with Services, FLA. TODAY (Brevard Cty., Fl.), Sept. 5, 2009, at 10C;
Starrs, supra note 162.
243 See Birk, supra note 161 ("His independent pharmacy in Beverly Hills will be among the
first in the region to employ Parata Max, the latest generation of robotic pill dispensers from a
pharmacy-automation manufacturer based in North Carolina. Scheduled to be unveiled this week at
a trade show in Las Vegas, the machine can fill about 200 prescriptions an hour with a miscount of
I in 10,000"); Resilient, supra note 242 ("The ability of community pharmacies to modify their
business operations through greater efficiencies has been critical. Technological advancement has
played a prominent role. For example, 67% use point-of-sale systems, 42% use integrated voice
response systems, and 31% use automated dispensing counters"); Sonnenberg, supra note 242, at
IOC ("Already focused on individualized care, the independents are striving to take the lead in
medication adherence. The association has already developed a technology software company
called Mirixa that helps facilitate pharmacies' review of medications to determine whether certain
drugs are redundant or should modified.").
244 Birk, supra note 161, at Cl; R. Leonard Felson, Small Pharmacies Struggle To Survive,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at 13CN; Nichols, supra note 242; Resilient, supra note 242;
Sonnenberg, supra note 242, at I OC.
245 Starrs, supra note 162.
246 Best, supra note 242, at Cl.
247 Allison Miles, Independent Pharmacies Face Issues and Obstacles, but Industry Remains
Strong, VICTORIA ADVOCATE (Tex.) (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.victoriaadvocate.com/news/
2009/dec/16/ym-am-pharmacies_122009_77207/?business; Nichols, supra note 242; Resilient,
supra note 242; Sonnenberg, supra note 242, at I OC.
248 Resilient, supra note 242.
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consumers for particularized products or services" where the cost of coordination
prevents larger business from satisfying that demand. 250
Accordingly, existing evidence calls into question both the assumption that
independents provide superior quality and that their continued existence is
threatened by PBMs.
b. The Promise of Collective Bargaining in Increasing Quality of Care
Even if independents could demonstrate a clear quality advantage, they still
would need to prove that an antitrust exemption would be the best - or at least a
good - way to improve patients' quality of care. There is no guarantee,
however, that if Congress exempted pharmacists from antitrust laws, these
pharmacists would focus their efforts on attempts to secure real gains for
consumers, such as lower medication prices and preapproval requirements or
expanded PBM formularies.
The only available evidence points exactly in the opposite direction. Where
pharmacists in the past flagrantly have disregarded antitrust laws, they have
colluded not to secure gains for consumers but rather only to raise reimbursement
levels to increase their own profit margins. For example, in the mid- to late-
1990s, the Asociacion de Farmacias Region de Arecibo (AFRA), a Northern
Puerto Rican association composed of 125 pharmacies, colluded to set the price
schedule associated with a government-sponsored insurance program for the
indigent.251 In threatening to boycott the plan administrator if it did not accede to
the association's fee demands, AFRA obtained an immense twenty-two percent
increase over the price levels that members would have obtained under the prior
fee schedule.252 Similarly, in the 1980s, the Chain Pharmacy Association of New
York State attempted along with several individual pharmacies to participate in a
group boycott of the New York State Employees Prescription Program. 53 After
agreeing amongst themselves to refuse to participate in the plan at the proposed
reimbursement levels, the pharmacies coerced the State of New York into paing
additional sums in excess of seven million dollars for prescription drugs. In
case after case, where pharmacists have disregarded antitrust laws, it has been to
benefit their own fee schedules and reimbursement rates rather than to obtain
direct quality enhancements for consumers.255
250 Priest, supra note 214, at 7.
251 Asociacion de Farmacias Region de Arecibo, 127 F.T.C. 266, 268-69 (1999), available at
1999 WL 33912988 (F.T.C.) (consent order).
252 Id. at 270.
253 Peterson Drug Co., 115 F.T.C. 492 (1992), available at 199 WL 12011049 (F.T.C.)
(consent order).
254 Id. at 496-97.
255 See, e.g., Institutional Pharmacy Network, 126 F.T.C. 138 (1998), available at 1998 WL
34300603 (F.T.C.) (consent order); RxCare of Tenn., Inc., 121 F.T.C. 762 (1996), available at
1996 WL 33412062 (F.T.C.) (consent order); Baltimore Metro. Pharm. Ass'n, 117 F.T.C. 95
247
50
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/4
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Even if one accepts the dubious possibility that pharmacists could secure
256transparent gains for consumers through collective bargaining, bargaining is
an ill-fitted mechanism to employ in trying to accomplish that goal. The drafters
of the NLRA never intended the Act to address issues concerning roduct or
service quality, let alone that of the crucial service of health care. Instead,
"[c]ollective bargaining rights are designed to raise the incomes and improve the
working conditions of union members." 258
Collective bargaining is not set up as a natural mechanism for achieving
higher levels of quality because bargaining over wages is inherently self-
interested. If pharmacists, in their negotiations with PBMs, secured the types of
benefits that would assist patients - such as broader formulary lists and reduced
preapproval requirements - they would have to compensate for these
concessions through reductions (or smaller gains) in their own fee schedules and
reimbursement rates. Inevitably, this would place pharmacists in the conflicted
position of having to choose between interests of their customers and of
themselves.
Finally, independents gloss over the fact that current antitrust regulations
already permit other forms of quality-enhancing, procompetitive collaboration.
Under the 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare,
pharmacies, in many instances, can form pharmacy-owned PBM joint ventures,
joint buying arrangements in the purchase of pharmaceuticals from wholesalers
259
and manufactures, and PPOs. Because many of these arrangements improve
efficiencies and health care quality by utilizing electronic health records and
shared support mechanisms, they are legal under antitrust laws.260
Specifically with regards to joint purchasing arrangements, the DOJ and
FTC have recognized that such collaboration frequently creates economies of
scale (and thus benefits rather than harms consumers).261 To eliminate
(1994), available at 1994 WL 16010975 (F.T.C.) (consent order); Se. Colo. Pharmacal Ass'n, 116
F.T.C. 51 (1993), available at 1993 WL 13009600 (F.T.C.) (consent order); Pharm. Soc'y of
Orange Cty., Inc., 113 F.T.C. 645 (1990), available at 1990 WL 10012620 (F.T.C.) (consent
order); Pharm. Soc'y of the State of N.Y., Inc., 113 F.T.C. 661 (1990), available at 1990 WL
10012621 (F.T.C.) (consent order).
256 See supra Section I1ll.B.
257 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
258 Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
to Sen. William J. Seitz 9-10 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/
02/VO80001 homecare.pdf.
259 See supra note 46-49 and accompanying text.
260 Healthcare Competition Hearing, supra note 46, at 7 (statement of Richard A. Feinstein,
Dir., Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission).
261 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 38 at 53 ("Such collaborative
activities typically allow the participants to achieve efficiencies that will benefit consumers. Joint
purchasing arrangements usually involve the purchase of a product or service used in providing the
ultimate package of heath care services or products sold by participants. . . . Through such joint
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uncertainty among providers who fear antitrust exposure from forming such a
cooperative, the DOJ and FTC, through guidelines, have "set[] forth an antitrust
safety zone that describes joint purchasing arrangements . . . that will not be
challenged, absent extraordinary circumstances, by the [two] Agencies under the
antitrust laws."262 The agencies have pledged that "absent extraordinary
circumstances," they will not challenge "any joint purchasing agreement among
health care providers," provided the following two conditions are met:
(1) the purchases account for less than 35 percent of the
total sales of the purchased product or service in the
relevant market; and
(2) the cost of the products and services purchased jointly
accounts for less than 20 percent of the total revenues
from all products or services sold by each competing
participant in the joint purchasing arrangement. 263
Moreover, the FTC and DOJ further have identified a set of conditions under
which "[j]oint purchasing arrangements . . . that fall outside the antitrust safety
zone" remain unlikely to "raise antitrust concerns." 264 While pharmacists are
typically acting as sellers rather than buyers in their negotiations with PBMs,
transaction costs, and have access to consulting advice that may not be available to each
participants on its own.").
262 Id. at 54. In addition to relying on the published Guidelines, pharmacists have the option
of directly requesting advisory opinions from the FTC that are customized to their own specific fact
situations. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GUIDANCE FROM STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION'S
HEALTH CARE DIVISION ON REQUESTING AND OBTAINING AN ADVISORY OPINION (2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/advop-general.pdf, see, e.g., Letter from Michael
D. McNeely, Assistant Dir., Federal. Trade Comm'n, to Allen Nichol (Aug. 12, 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/08/newjerad.htm (stating that the FTC would not recommend a
challenge to a proposal to implement two "pharmacist service networks," which would offer health
education and monitoring services to patients with diabetes and asthma); Letter from Richard A.
Feinstein, Assistant Dir., Health Care Services and Products, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Paul E. Levenson (July 27, 2000), available at http://ftc.gov/bc/adops/neletfi5.shtm
(advising that the FTC would not challenge a proposal to establish a network of independent
pharmacists that would provide medical management of patients with chronic or long-term illnesses
in order to increase medication compliance and reduce patient error).
263 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 38, at 54-55. While the first of
these conditions ensures that the joint purchasing arrangement will not "be able to drive down the
price of the product or service being purchased below competitive levels," "[t]he second condition
addresses any possibility that a joint purchasing arrangement might result in standardized costs,
thus facilitating price fixing or otherwise having anticompetitive effects." Id. at 55.
264 Id. at 57 (identifying three "safeguards [that] will reduce substantially, if not completely
eliminate, use of the purchasing arrangement as a vehicle for discussing and coordinating the prices
of health care services offered by the participants" and stating that "[t]he adoption of these
safeguards also will help demonstrate that the joint purchasing arrangement is intended to achieve
economic efficiencies rather than to serve an anticompetitive purpose").
249
52
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/4
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
these guidelines still apply in their dealings with wholesalers and manufacturers
in purchasing pharmaceuticals. Accordingly, these guidelines may be used by
independents in reducing the cost of their inputs, thus raising profits margins.
With such procompetitive mechanisms to increase simultaneously market
efficiency and health care quality, there is no reason to allow pharmacists to
resort to the formation of cartels, whose quality-enhancing effects are highly
questionable and rest on unsound economic policy.
CONCLUSION
The pharmaceutical industry has changed dramatically in response to the
explosion in managed care and MCO efforts to cut costs. Pharmacists have
reacted by charging that such measures for cost cutting not only shut small
community pharmacists out of the market, but also negatively impact the quality
of care that they can provide. In response to these concerns, legislative
representatives have put forth numerous bills over the past two decades hoping to
secure an exemption under the antitrust laws for pharmacists so that they can
bargain collectively with PBMs and MCOs. While these attempts have failed to
date, some of the bills have enjoyed bipartisan political support, and providers
have demonstrated their tenacity in continuing to fight for an exemption.
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the pharmacy lobby in pushing its
agenda in Congress, such an exemption would be unwise from an economic and
public-policy perspective. In their quest for an exemption, independents have not
identified any sufficiently compelling societal goal to trump the gains created by
free-market competition. Permitting independent pharmacy cartels would be
antithetical to the policies underlying our nation's antitrust laws, which have
recognized explicitly that in order to safeguard competition and further consumer
welfare, those businesses that are less than maximally efficient are destined to
struggle or fail. This conclusion is supported by empirical data suggesting that an
exemption for pharmacists significantly would increase health care costs without
a necessary boost in health care quality. Furthermore, it is not clear from the
relative bargaining power wielded by health care providers or the industry
success of independent pharmacies that an exemption is needed. Many report that
the insurance market is indeed competitive and that pharmacists may not be in as
precarious positions as some suggest. In addition, under current laws that pertain
to health care providers, pharmacists already have a variety of tools at their
disposal to collaborate where such collaboration would be procompetitive.
Because collusive behavior directly harms consumers in favor of a select
group of producers, academics and practitioners alike have criticized harshly
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Health Care Coalition Act.265 Commentators argue that while "exemptions
proposed to Congress are normally justified on the basis of one or more of a
handful of economic arguments ,6. . . . these claims often lack substantial
documented empirical support." Instead, exemptions tend to be special-
interest-group legislation designed to benefit a few at the expense of many.267
Consistent with public-choice theory,268 small groups, like the pharmacy lobby,
who are more willing to organize and spend money on lobbying efforts tend to
monopolize the legislative process at the expense of diffuse, unorganized groups
such as health care consumers. 269 Because Congress has designed many of these
exemptions to benefit select groups of producers, rather than consumers,
exemptions end up serving as "a form of indirect subsidy for favored actors ...
[who] will be made wealthier without serving the sought-for public interest
goals." 270
It is important to note that this is not to say that the preservation of small
business in the United States, even at the expense of other values, such as
economic efficiency and lower prices, is not a laudable goal--or one that is
undeserving of legislation. This question is not at the heart of this Note and must
be evaluated on its own terms. It is to say, however, that it is disingenuous to
advance these goals under the catch phrases of "economic efficiency," "lower
prices," and "greater health care quality" when these claims remain unsupported
by the evidence. To do so is to cloak a subsidy in an antitrust exemption imbibed
with consumer-welfare arguments. Once the true issues and values at stake are
brought to the forefront, we as a society can engage in a more honest and open
265 For example, the American Bar Association has criticized the Soft Drink Interbrand
Competition Act, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and the Newspaper Preservation Act as all having
"transferred wealth, but hav[ing] not produced the public interest benefits on which they were
initially justified." SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
FROM ANTITRUST LAW 293 (2007) [hereinafter ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH].
266 Id. at 4.
267 See Small Business Competition Policy: Are Markets Open for Entrepreneurs?: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., I10th Cong. 58-59 (2008) (statement of William E. Kovacic,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
268 For an excellent analysis applying public choice theory to antitrust exemptions, see Am.
Bar Ass'n, Comments, in ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH, supra note 265, app. B, at 331-32.
269 See ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH, supra note 265, at 295 ("Exemptions and
modifications have normally been sought by the relevant industry itself or by some other interest
with a pecuniary stake in the affected market. . . . [I]n different contexts separate constituencies
have varying levels of influence and varying incentives to exercise it. . . . [G]roups that would not
favor the exemption are diffuse and lack incentives to organize and challenge the merits of the
proposed exemptions effectively."); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 335 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report
recommendation/amcfinalreport.pdf (explaining that antitrust exemptions typically "create
economic benefits that flow to small, concentrated interest groups, while the costs of the exemption
are widely dispersed, usually passed on to a large population of consumers through higher prices,
reduced output, lower quality, and reduced innovation").
270 ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH, supra note 265, at 25.
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debate as to what we wish to achieve and best mechanisms to obtain those goals.
For example, if we value small business and want to keep independents alive, is
collective bargaining the best route or would a more honest approach be to grant
a direct subsidy to the desired group through the structuring of our tax system? 271
Moreover, if we want to preserve small business, do we want to help those in all
sectors of society equally or is there something about independent pharmacists
that make them particularly worthy of attention?
Finally, even though collective bargaining may not be a logical method of
addressing pharmacists' concerns, pharmacists may very well have legitimate
concerns about the conduct of PBMs and MCOs in the pharmaceutical arena. The
place to address these grievances, however, is not through legislation that would
offer a broad antitrust exemption. Lawmakers should regulate PBMs'
anticompetitive practices directly and continue to fight anticompetitive activity
through litigation rather than leave the fate of vulnerable patients up to the
unsupervised market power of the PBMs. For example, state legislators have
passed laws including, but certainly not limited to regulating or banning
requirements that beneficiaries obtain drugs solely by mail order,2 setting PBM
disclosure and transparency requirements, 73 mandating that networks include a
certain number of pharmacies in a set geographical area or preventing
discrimination against pharmacies that agree to meet a plan's terms and
conditions,274 and recognizing that PBMs have certain fiduciary duties with
respect to covered entities.275 Such direct targeting is preferable to sanctioning
the cartelization of independent pharmacies. Through these efforts to restrain the
anticompetitive practices of PBMs, the interests of pharmacists and lawmakers
may align to resolve pharmacists' concerns about their bargaining power while
truly improving patients' quality of care.
271 See id. at 298-99.
272 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1410 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-114 (2012);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-510 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-4.3 (2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1011 (2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-9-6 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-513.02
(2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.7 (West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-117 (2008).
273 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.20 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-304.3
(2005); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2699 (2004 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.214
(West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2E-1 (LexisNexis 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E-4
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-3203 (Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 9472 (Supp. 2012).
274 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,153 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3B
(West 2007 & Supp. 2012); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-9-6 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 26:21-4.7 (West
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-18-37 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2359 (2008 & Supp.
2012).
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